THE FOUR MYSORE WARS AND THE CONQUESTS OF TAMIL NADU

IN COMMEMORATION: GOLDEN JUBILEE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF ARCHIVISTS

18th - 19th September, 2025
Chennai

Published by
COMMISSIONER
TAMIL NADU ARCHIVES AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
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முனைவர் கோவி. செழியன்
உயர்கல்வித் துறை அமைச்சர்

தலைமைச் செயலகம்,
சென்னை 600 009.

அணிந்துரை

'1857-க்கு முன்னர் தமிழ்நாட்டில் பிரிட்டிஷ் ஆட்சிக்கு எதிரான கிளர்ச்சிகளும் உன்னதத் தியாகங்களும்' *(Revolts against British Rule in Tamil Nadu and Supreme Sacrifices Prior to 1857 A.D. "* மற்றும் நான்கு மைசூர் போர்களும் தமிழ்நாட்டினைக் கைப்பற்றலும் *(The Four Mysore Wars and the Conquests of Tamil Nadu)* ஆகிய நூல்களை வெளியிடுவதில் நான் மகிழ்ச்சியடைகிறேன். தேசிய ஆவணக் காப்பாளர்களின் குழுவின் பொன்விழா கூட்டத்தையொட்டி, தமிழ்நாடு ஆவணக் காப்பகம் மற்றும் வரலாற்று ஆராய்ச்சித்துறை இந்நூல்களை வெளியிடுவதிலும், இக்கூட்டத்தை தமிழ்நாட்டின் தலைநகராம், சென்னை மாநகரில் நடத்துவதிலும் எனக்குப் பெரும் மகிழ்ச்சி.

இந்நூல்கள் தென்னிந்திய ஆட்சியாளர்கள் ஆங்கிலேய கிழக்கு இந்திய கம்பெனிக்கு எதிராக நடத்திய போர்களையும் கிளர்ச்சிகளையும் ஆவணப்படுத்தி, அவர்கள் நாட்டிற்காகச் செய்த தியாகங்களையும் வெளிப்படுத்துகின்றன. பூலித்தேவர், வீரபாண்டிய கட்டபொம்மன், ஊமைத்துரை, மருது சகோதரர்கள், ஹைதர் அலி, திப்பு சுல்தான் ஆகியோரின் வீரச் செயல்களும் தியாகங்களும், தமிழ்நாடு ஆவணக் காப்பகத் துறையில் பாதுகாக்கப்பட்டுள்ள மூலச்சான்று ஆவணங்களின் மூலம் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. நமது நாட்டின் சமூக, அரசியல், பொருளாதார மற்றும் பண்பாட்டு வரலாற்றைப் பாதுகாக்கவும் பதிவு செய்யவும் ஆவணக் காப்பாளர்களின் பங்கு இன்றியமையாதது.

இந்நூல்களை வெளியிடுவதில் பெரும் பங்காற்றிய முதன்மைச் செயலாளர் /ஆணையர் அவர்களுக்கும், ஆசிரியர் குழுவிற்கும் மற்றும் அனைத்து அலுவலர்களுக்கும் என் பாராட்டுகளைத் தெரிவித்துக் கொள்கிறேன்.

அன்புடன்...

நாள்: 16. 09. 2025.

(கோவி. செழியன்)

முனைவர் **பொ. சங்கர்** இ.ஆ.ப.
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வாழ்த்துச் செய்தி

தேசிய ஆவணக் காப்பாளர்கள் குழுவின் பொன்விழா கூட்டத்தை நடத்துவதற்கான வாய்ப்பைப் பெற்றிருப்பது உயர்கல்வித் துறை மற்றும் ஆவணக் காப்பகத் துறைக்குப் பெருமை அளிக்கிறது. ஆவணக் காப்பாளர்கள் ஆவணங்களைப் பாதுகாத்து அவற்றை அரசுத் துறைகளின் நிர்வாக நடவடிக்கைகளுக்குக் கிடைக்கச் செய்வதில் அத்தியாவசியப் பங்காற்றுகின்றனர். மேலும், ஆவணங்கள் வழியாக ஒரு நாட்டின் சமூகப் பொருளாதார அரசியல் வரலாற்றை வடிவமைப்பதிலும் அவர்கள் முக்கியப் பங்காற்றுகின்றனர்.

இந்தச் சிறப்பு நிகழ்ச்சியை முன்னிட்டு, ஆவணக் காப்பகம் மற்றும் வரலாற்று ஆராய்ச்சித்துறை இரண்டு நூல்களை வெளியிடுகிறது. அவை 1857க்கு முன்னர் தமிழ்நாட்டில் பிரிட்டிஷ் ஆட்சிக்கு எதிரான கிளர்ச்சிகளும் உன்னதத் தியாகங்களும்' *(Revolts against British Rule in Tamil Nadu and Supreme Sacrifices Prior to 1857 A.D.)* போர்களும் தமிழ்நாட்டினைக் கைப்பற்றலும் *(The Four Mysore Wars and the Conquests of Tamil Nadu)* ஆகும். இந்நூல்கள் பூலித்தேவர், வீரபாண்டிய கட்டபொம்மன், ஊமைத்துரை, மருது சகோதரர்கள், ராணி வேலுநாச்சியார். விருப்பாட்சி கோபால நாயக்கர், திப்பு சுல்தான், ஹைதர் அலி ஆகியோரின் தியாகங்களையும், மைசூர்ப் போர்களின் விரிவான விவரங்களையும் தென்னிந்திய வரலாற்றில் அவற்றின் தாக்கத்தையும் விளக்குகின்றன.

இந்நூல்களை வெளியிட உழைத்த ஆவணக் காப்பகத் துறை முதன்மைச் செயலாளர் / ஆணையர் அவர்களுக்கும் மற்றும் ஆவணக் காப்பக அலுவலர்கள் அனைவருக்கும் என் மனமார்ந்த பாராட்டுகள். இப்பொன்விழா கூட்டம் சிறப்பாக நடைபெற என் வாழ்த்துகள்.

16.09.25



(முனைவர் பொ. சங்கர்)

HAR SAHAY MEENA, I.A.S.
Principal Secretary/Commissioner
ஹர் சஹாய் மீனா, இ.ஆ.ப.,
முதன்மைச் செயலாளர் / ஆணையர்

Tamil Nadu Archives and
Historical Research Centre,
Department of Higher Education,
Government of Tamil Nadu.

INTRODUCTION

It is a great honour for the Tamil Nadu Archives and Historical Research, under the Department of Higher Education, Government of Tamil Nadu, to host the Golden Jubilee Meeting of the National Committee of Archivists, at Chennai.

The role of archivists in a democratic country is vital. They preserve records and make them available to the Government for the effective conduct of day-to-day administration. As archival records are the primary sources of contemporary history, archivists also guide researchers, students, and scholars by helping them identify the sources they require for their studies.

It is really a matter of immense pleasure that we are releasing books by incorporating the events of early revolts and rebellions of Tamil Nadu pertaining to the 18th Century, prior to the 1857 Mutiny, during two days meeting.

The first publication, titled *"Revolts against British Rule in Tamil Nadu and Supreme Sacrifices prior to 1857 A.D"* portrays the South Indian martyrs who had laid down their lives in the cause of our freedom.

The second publication, titled *"The Four Mysore Wars and the Conquests of Tamil Nadu,"* provides a detailed account of the decisive struggles fought by Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan against the East India Company, highlighting their significance in the history of South India.

The events mentioned in these books are extracted from original contemporary archival records preserved in the Tamil Nadu Archives and Historical Research. These volumes document the sacrifices of early martyrs from Tamil Nadu, including Poolee Thevar, Veera Pandiya Kattabomman, Umaithurai, the Maruthu Brothers, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan and provide detailed accounts of the Mysore wars and their impact on South India. These books will be useful for historians, researchers and students as genuine and authentic references.

I wish to record my deep appreciation to the Editor and Assistant Editors of the Gazetteer Section, and the staff of the Archives for their hard work and cooperation in bringing out these books within short duration of time.

Chennai-600 008
16.09.2025

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THE FOUR MYSORE WARS AND THE CONQUESTS OF TAMIL NADU – AN INTRODUCTION

RISE OF HAIDAR ALI AND THE MYSORE WARS

On the death of Aurangzib in 1707 A.D., rapid disintegration set in throughout the Mughal dominions. Daud Khan, who was left in command of the Carnatic provinces, followed northwards shortly after, nominating as his deputy Sadat-ulla Khan. The territory directly under Sadat-ulla Khan comprised Carnatic Haidarabad, Payinghat and Carnatic Bijapur which by this time came to be known as the provinces of Arcot and Sira respectively. Meanwhile, in Mysore, Chikka Deva Raja had been succeeded by his son, a deaf-mute, and hence forward that State was ruled by its ministers, in the names of puppet Rajas. [1]

Sadat-ulla Khan at first enjoyed, under the suzerainty of the Nizam, the undivided control of the two Carnatics, but after four years his jurisdiction was restricted to the province of Arcot, and a new Nawab, Amin Khan, was appointed for Sira. Sadat-ulla Khan resented the removal of the rich State of Mysore from his jurisdiction, and formed a conspiracy with the Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool, Savanur and the Maratha chief Morari Rao Ghorpade of Gooty to seize it. The new Nawab, Amin Khan, compromised by suggesting joint action against the Raja of Mysore. Accordingly the confederates levied blackmail to the extent of a crore of rupees. Hence forward the funds of the unfortunate State of Mysore were looked on as the lawful property of of anyone who was strong enough to demand their surrender.

Meanwhile, one Abdul Nabi Khan, the Pathan Nawab of Cuddapah, theoretically a subordinate [2] of Zulfikar Khan as a Jaghir to Abdul Nabi Khan. the officer holding the joint command of the Carnatics, absorbed four of the five Circars of the Carnatic Haidarabad. Before, however, Nizam-Ul-Mulk, the first Nizam of Haiderabad had consolidated his power, Abdul Nabi Khan had become practically independent. He extended his possessions southward along the back of the Eastern Ghats, nearly to the Kaveri, and by 1714 A.D., he had made himself master of the Baramahal.[3]

Mysore was one of those provinces which had sprung up after the dissolution of the Vijianagar kingdom. After reigning for two centuries the Hindu line of princes had become effete, and their authority was usurped by a prime minister named Nanjeraj.

1 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 73.
2 According to the Baramahal tradition, (S.D.M. Vol.I, p.89), the Baramahal was granted by
3 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 73.

Nizam-ul-Mulk



Plan of Wandiwash fort

Under the auspices of Nanjeraj, the celebrated Haider Ali first rose into distinction. He was born in 1702, the son of a petty officer, and began his career with the command of a small body of horse and foot. From this he was shortly promoted to the charge of the province of Dindigul, where, by consummate dissimulation and indiscriminate plunder, he gradually increased the forces under his command and paved the way for supplanting the supplanter of the Mysore Raj. [4]

An inroad of the Marathas, which reduced the minister to the greatest straits, afforded Haider his first opportunity. He came forward to the assistance of Nanjeraj with the money required to meet the Mahratta demand, and received as an acknowledgment extensive jaghires. By gradually increasing the obligations under which the minister lay, Haider managed in time to acquire nearly half of the dominions of the Mysore Raj. But at length the jealousy of his patron was awakened, and an army was despatched which totally defeated Haider. He, however, lost none of his self-possession, but cunningly throwing his pursuer off his guard, raised another army with which he presented himself before the Mysore capital and demanded payment of his debts. Payment was impossible, and the Rajah, yielding to necessity, resigned his authority to Haider on condition of receiving for himself and his minister liberal assignments from the revenues of the province. [5]

After the death of Nizam-ul-mulk in the year 1748, a war of succession followed, in which the French and English took sides and for the first time came into political prominence. Nanja Raj, Chief Minister of Mysore State, tried to get the cession of Trichinopoly from Muhammed Ali, Nawab of Arcot, and then intrigued with the French. His share in the war cost him money, but brought him no gain. It was in this war that the obscure adventurer, Haidar Ali, became the most powerful subject in the service of Mysore. [6]

On January 22, 1760, the French had been vanquished by the British forces at Wandiwash. The French General Lally, as a last resort, applied to Haidar for help. Haidar thereon sent his brother-in-law, Makhdum Ali, to Pondicherry to negotiate. The treaty was to stipulate the cession to Mysore of Tiyaga, a fort which commanded the Attur Pass. At the conclusion of the war, Trichinopoly, Madura, and Tinnevelly were to be ceded to Haidar. Makhdum Ali proceeded to Pondicherry before the end of June and ratified the treaty. He was recalled with all his forces by the urgent necessity of Haidar. The conspiracy of Khande Rao with the puppet Raja and the Marathas had all but terminated his career. Makhdum Ali, after hard fighting, got as far as Kelamangalam and occupied Anchetti-durgam. Here he was closely blockaded, and every attempt of Haidar's force at Anekal

4 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 54.
5 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55.
6 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 74.



Haider Ali



The Third battle of Panipat 13 January 1761

to effect a junction failed. Haidar then resorted to the expedient of bribing the Marathas to desert Khande Rao. The bribe succeeded. Three lakhs were paid and Baramahal was ceded. Haidar joined his brother-in-law, defeated Khande Rao and assumed the supreme control of Mysore affairs.

In the year 1761, Marathas perished in the Third Battle of Panipat fighting against Afghan Abdali. In the same year, Haidar Ali, emboldened by the catastrophe at Panipat, usurped the Government of Mysore. [7]

It was in 1761 that Haider assumed the supreme authority in Mysore. There was a temporary lull in the strife between the two great European nations (England and France) which had been brought about by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Nizam Ali had usurped the soubedari of the Deccan, and the recognition of his claims by the French had rendered Mahomad Ali's Nawabship more secure. [8]

The year 1766 saw the death of the Raja Chick Kishen Raj, to whose nominal honours his son Nanjiraj Wadiyar succeeded ; and Haidar, having reduced Malabar to subjection, was free to grapple with the triple alliance between the English, Nizam Ali and the Marathas. [9]

Already, Haider's rising power led the Marathas to send an expedition against him in 1765. He was defeated and forced to cede a large extent of territory, besides paying a heavy indemnity. Within a year he however proved that his resources were very far from being destroyed, for he extended his territory by extensive acquisitions upon the Western Coast, and thus led the Nizam and Marathas to form the confederacy referred to, for the purpose of effectually humbling his pride.

The English were invited to assist in crushing the man, who was with truth represented to be the common enemy to the peace of Southern India, and they agreed to join the confederacy. The situation led to the war of 1767-69, a war on which the English entered, as against Haider, not only without any colour of provocation, but in blindness as to their own interests, which at the time were directly involved in the maintenance of Haidar's independence. [10]

The British administration considered the rising powers of Haider as a mere adventure. But, the British had to wage four major wars with Haider and his equally brave son Tipu to establish their supremacy in the Carnatic. These wars in the history are known as First, Second, Third and Fourth Mysore Wars.

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7 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 75.
8 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 56.
9 As above.
10 As above.

British conquest of Baramahal, 1767

THE FIRST WAR OF MYSORE, (1767-1769)

Reasons for the War:

Haidar Ali, in alliance with Basalat Jang (brother of then Haidarabad Nizam), drove the Marathas out of Sira and created Nawab of Sira and bestowed title on Basalat Jung. The seizure of Sira by Haidar was an insult to the Marathas which brought speedy retribution. In 1764, the Peshwa himself invaded Mysore; by June, Haidar had sustained a crushing defeat and in February of the following year he bought off the Marathas with an indemnity of 32 lakhs. In 1766, the pageant Raja died. His son, a youth of 18 years, was set on the throne by Haidar. The young prince chafed against Haidar's authority. Haidar confiscated all his property, and placed him in confinement. This act determined the Marathas and Nizam Ali and precipitated the First Mysore War. [11]

The War of 1767-69 was a sequel to the treaty of November 12, 1766, between the Company (represented by General Calliaud) and Nizam Ali. In pursuance of their undertaking, plans for a joint invasion of Haidar's territory were agreed to by the Marathas, the Nizam and the English. [12]

Early Advances made by the Maratha and Nizam's forces, Haider's strategy, 1767:

It was arranged that the Nizam with the English should reduce the fort of Bangalore, while the Marathas advanced across the Kistna (in pursuit of attack on Mysore). Early in 1767 the advance was made, but Haider succeeded in buying off the Marathas. [13]

It was the Marathas moved first, early in March 1767, before their allies could join them, and they had overrun the Mysore dominions as far as the Baramahal, brought Haidar to his knees, and agreed to withdraw from the war on the payment of 17 ½ lakhs cash down, and the pledge of Kolar District as security for the payment of a like sum in addition. The balance was paid early in May, and on the 11th of that month the Marathas finally moved northwards. And soon after, Haider detached the Nizam as well, from the confederacy.

Meanwhile the army of the Nizam had, by March 9th reached the Tungabhadra and was joined by Colonel Joseph Smith, with six battalions of infantry and some guns. On March 24th the allies learned that the Marathas had been bribed to withdraw. [14]

Colonel Smith soon discovered that Haidar was making overtures to the Nizam also

11 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 75.
12 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 57.
13 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55.
14 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 76.

Colonel Donald Campbell

Krishnagiri fort was besieged in the First Anglo-Mysore War in 1768,
and finally surrendered to the British, who held it briefly

which the latter was prepared to accept. Colonel Smith, who commanded the Madras army, had therefore to act alone. He had marched without delay into the Baramahal, but perceiving unmistakable signs of the Nizam's defection, retired towards the frontiers of the Carnatic. [15]

He accordingly withdrew part of his force, but the Madras Government insisted on three battalions remaining in the Nizam's camp. This force was soon afterwards suffered by the Nizam to depart with a few days of the actual outbreak of hostilities between Haidar and the British. [16]

British conquest of Baramahal, 1767 :

While the Nizam's army was approaching Bangalore from the north, a respectable force of 3000 foot, 500 of whom were British, was despatched from Madras with the object of seizing the Baramahal. The mud forts of Vaniyambadi, Tiruppattur and Kaveripatnam fell without serious opposition, and on June 3rd an unsuccessful attempt was made to storm Krishnagiri. The siege was then converted into a blockade, the prosecution of which absorbed the energies of the whole force, and precluded further active operations.

On his return from the Nizam's camp near Bangalore, Colonel Smith was directed to assume general command of the British troops in the Baramahal. In the latter part of August the combined armies of Haidar and Nizam Ali descended the Krishnagiri Passes and on the 25th, the transport cattle in the vicinity of the British camp near Kakankarai were surprised and driven off. [17]

Haider on advancing and descending the ghats received a decided check on August 25th at Chengam, and subsequently suffered a further defeat at Tiruvannamalai, but inspite of these reverses he was able to make his way to Vellore and encamp there during the rains. Colonel Smith at the same time withdrew his forces into cantonments at Wandiwash, Conjeeveram, and Trichinopoly. [18]

In the latter part of August, the combined armies of Haidar and Nizam Ali descended the Krishnagiri Passes, and the transport cattle which were grazing in the vicinity of the British camp near Kakankarai, were surprised and driven off. Smiths's cavalry hastily moved out for their recovery and were unexpectedly assailed by very superior numbers under Makhdum Ali, who charged them into the very lines of encampment after destroying about one-third of their number and carried off the greater part of the cattle.

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15 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55..
16 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55..
17 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 76.
18 Same as above.

The same evening Haidar appeared before Kaveripatnam and delivered two assaults on the three companies held by Captain McKain which were repulsed. But Captain McKain finding the place untenable, capitulated on August 27th. [19]

By this time Colonel Wood was advancing with reinforcement from Trichinopoly towards Tiruvannamali and it became a matter of vital moment that Colonel Smith should join him. Smith, crippled by the loss of cattle on the 25th, was unable to move till the 28th. He fell back eastward, reaching Singarapet on the 30th, Pallipatti on the 31st and Chengam on September 1st. Haidar followed close on his heels.

It was lucky for the British that Haidar did not forestall them and seize the Chengam pass. On September 2nd Smith turned to bay at Chengam and won a victory. Smith then proceeded to Tiruvannamalai.

There on the 26th he brought on a pitched battle with Haidar and won a decisive victory. The Nizam and his army bolted, 55 field pieces were taken and Haidar was compelled to retire into Baramahal. Colonel Smith proceeded to Madras in the hope of effecting some improvement in the departments of supply.

Haidar, led by the continued inactivity of the British, resumed the offensive, recaptured Tiruppattur on the 5th and Vaniyambadi on the 7th and appeared before Ambur on the 10th. Vaniyambadi was surrendered by Captain Robinson, on parole not to serve again during the war, a promise which he subsequently broke. [20]

The Ambur episode, 1767 :

Haidar was engaged in investing Amburdrug, a fort of considerable strength, built upon the summit of a rooky hill which is accessible upon only one of its faces. The place was invested on November 10th, and five days later the lower fort was so dismantled that Captain Calvert, the English commander, was obliged to retire to the citadel upon the summit of the rook. His garrison consisted of but one commissioned officer, a serjeant, and 15 European soldiers, with 500 sepoys. The fort had, during the opening portion of the campaign, been left in the command of its Mahommedan Killadar, Kuchlis Khan, whom Haider had been in secret treaty with, and had succeeded in persuading to betray the fort. The plot was happily discovered, but only at the critical moment when Calvert was driven out of the lower fort. He promptly committed the traitor, with his principal officers, to confinement in the drug, and disarming the disaffected troops, employed them in menial work connected with the siege. The defence of the upper fort was protracted for

19 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55..
20 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 77-78.

many days. Repeated surprises were defeated by the vigilance of the garrison, and Haider in despair determined to try whether the European commandant could not be bought, as the Mahommedan had been. Calvert replied to his message that the bearer of a second proposal of the kind would be hanged in the sight of the whole Mysore army, and Haider was therefore obliged to continue active operations. [21]

News of the critical condition of Ambur had by this time reached Colonel Smith, who arrived before the fort on December 7th, causing Haider to raise the siege and to retire to Kaveripak. Captain Calvert's spirited defence of Ambur was ended on December 7th by the appearance of Colonel Smith with a detachment from Vellore.

On the following day, Smith came in touch with Haidar at Vaniyambadi. Haidar fought a rear-guard action, retiring as soon as his retreat was secured, and abandoning Vaniyambadi. [22]

Battle in the Ghats, 1767 :

At this juncture the allies learned of demonstrations bv the Bombay Govemment against Mysore from the West Coast and by Bengal troops from the Northem Circars against Haidarabad, and of revolt of the Nayars of Malabar. ln consequence of this, Haidar, on December l4th, despatched his heavy guns and baggage with Tipu to the West, and four days later Nizam hurriedly re-ascended the Ghats. Haidar, before following his main army made one vigorous attempt in person to cut off a convoy, composed of the 1st-Battalion of Sepoys in charge of provisions, advancing under Captain R.V Fitzgerald from Tiruvanannamalai. Smith anticipated the move, and despatched Major Thomas Fitzgerald, with two companies of Grenadiers, the 5th Battalion or Sepoys, and two field-pieces to reinforce the convoy before Haidar could attack it. Haidar attacked the united forces in person. On December 29th, with a force of 4000 horse, 2000 foot and 5 guns and was badly beaten. Immediately after this, Haidar followed his main army up the Ghats, leaving Makhdum Sahib with a strong force, mainly cavalry, to watch the British, and action, their supplies. At the same moment the British army was compelled to fall back eastward on its communications, to save itself from starvation. [23]

Tipu's plundering of St. Thome, 1767 [24] :

In 1767, however, after constant vacillation, they concluded a treaty with the Nizam for the invasion of Mysore, the British forces to unite with the Nizam's on the Northern

21 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 55.-56.
22 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 78.
23 Same as above.
24 The Chingleput, Late Madras District, A Manual, by Charles Stewart Crole, p.190.

frontier of that province. This sudden change of policy was principally induced by the open espousal by Haider Ali of the claim of Maphuze Khan, elder brother of Mahommed Ali, to the Nabobship of the Carnatic.

The forces united only to prove the utter madness of the scheme ; for the Nizam was, like the Marathas, bribed to side with Haider, for whom he presently openly declared, thus leaving the British commander, Colonel Joseph Smith, to return to his own territory as best he might. He was able to seize the Pass of Chengama, 14 miles west of Tirunámalei in South Arcot, which he held stoutly against overwhelming odds, retreating to the latter place, whence, re inforced, he eventually sallied to inflict on the united forces a most complete defeat near the town. The Nizam and Haider retired during the monsoon to the Baramahal, mutually disgusted one with the other.

Tippoo, Haider's son, then only 17 years old, had been sent, under the guidance of Ghazu Khan, a faithful partizan, to ravage the country round Madras. He accordingly advanced to the Choultry Plain, pillaged St. Thome and the neighbouring villages, and plundered the country houses of the Members of Council at the Mount. The Government were powerless. They wrote home thus : " The continual reinforcements we had sent to camp had reduced our garrison so low, we were obliged to confine our attention entirely to the preservation of the Fort and the Black Town, for which purpose it was necessary to arm all the Company's Civil Servants, the European inhabitants, Armenians and Portuguese." They also begged for reinforcements from home.

Kaveripatinam Episode, 1768:

For seven months Haidar was fully occupied with affairs in the north and west, and the field was clear for the British forces. Divided counsels paralysed efficient action. [25]

On the 20th January 1768, Haidar marched to the West Coast, where he reduced Mangalore in May, and, returning to Mysore, despatched his army to Bangalore, while he departed in person to Bednore, and, after regulating his affairs both there and elsewhere, was at leisure to operate again in August, from Bangalore, against the English. The English had omitted to take advantage of the open field for their arms afforded by the absence of Haidar during the preceding seven months. The cause of this culpable mistake was the divided councils of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Government of Madras. Colonel Smith was unwilling to advance into the Mysore plateau owing to the difficulty of obtaining supplies, his proposed line of action being to occupy the whole of the country contiguous to the frontier, from Vaniambadi through the Barahmahal and Talaghat

25 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 79.

down to Dindigul and Palghat, in view to establishing depots as a base for subsequent operations. The Government at Madras, on the other hand, not realizing the obstacles entailed by an advance in the enemy's country, were for marching directly on Bangalore and Seringapatam. The upshot was a plan of operations devised to carry out both projects with a force inadequate to the full execution of either. [26]

The Government wished to invade the Balaghat, and strike directly at Bangalore and Seringapatnam. Colonel Smith realised that his force was quite, inadequate for the campaign without any proper commissariat, and proposed to occupy the whole of the country contiguous to the frontier from Vaniyambadi through the Baramahal and Talaghat down to Dindigul and Palghat. The result was an attempt to carry out both plans with a force inadequate for either. [27]

The English, however, were not wholly idle from January to August 1768. The army was formed into two columns, one headed by Colonel Smith with 1500 Europeans and 7500 sepoys to invade the Balaghat and another headed by Colonel Wood with 600 Europeans and 4400 sepoys to reduce the lowland forts in detail. On February 23rd Colonel Smith appeared before Kaveripatnam, which was promptly abandoned. He then received orders to proceed to the camp of the Nizam at Punganur. The Nizam had made overtures of peace to Colonel Smith as early as December 1767. A treaty was concluded between the Nizam and the Nawab on February 23rd which was signed by the members of the Council on the 26th. Shortly afterwards Smith returned to the Baramahal and undertook the blockade of Krishnagiri which surrendered on the 2nd May, 1768. [28]

A second division of the army was in the meanwhile employed under Colonel Wood, who, after the capture of the remaining fortified places in the southern extremity of the Barahmahal, proceeded with rapid success to reduce those which are situated in the districts of Salem, Erode, Coimbatur, and Dindigul. Haidar had the mortification to hear of the successive fall of every fortified place in those provinces, Bankagiridurgam alone excepted, the only place of strength which, by a strange omission, is never once mentioned in Colonel Wood's correspondence. Tenkaraikottai, the first place attacked, made a respectable defence, being garrisoned by regular sepoys, but capitulated when it was perceived that an assault was prepared. Dhannapuri, a place of no strength, was commanded by a brave officer with troops unworthy to serve under him ; the place was carried by assault, and the necessary consequences of such an operation bore a terror before the arms of Colonel Wood, which was more effectual than his cannon. Erode alone,

26 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 68.
27 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 79.
28 Same as above, p. 80.

a place of fiscal importance but no military strength, afterwards stood the assault, being encouraged by the presence of a body of horse, who promised to charge the flank and rear of the assailants in the act of storming, and did make a feeble effort for that purpose. All the other places, and among them Namakal and Dindigul, erected on hills of granite, surrendered without the semblance of a defence which could be reported to their master with even negative approbation. [29]

Hostilities at Krishnagiri and surroundings, 1768:

On June 8th an advanced detachment of the British army under Colonel Donald Campbell, moved from Krishnagiri and ascended the pass of Budikota; on the 10th Venkatagirikota occupied and the direct road to Vellore via Peddanayakan durgam secured. On the 23rd Mulbagal was taken, on the 28th Kolar. Meanwhile, Colonel Smith had ascended the Budikota Ghat with the main army and arrived at Araleri, where he directed Colonel Campbell to rejoin him. [30]

Capture of Bagalur and Hosur, 1768:

On July 3rd the united forces moved via Bagalur for the siege of Hosur, which fell on the 11th. The Bagalur Poligar, a feudatory of Haidar, prudently abstained from hostilities with the English, at the same time representing to Haidar his inability to resist and the necessity of temporizing until he had a better opportunity of evincing his allegiance.

Shortly after the fall of Hosur, a detachment under Colonel Cosby seized Anekal and Denkanikota.

At Hosur, Smith was joined by the advance guard of Morari Rao, the Maratha ruler of Gooty, whose services had been bargained for by the British and secured. Smith then moved to lloskote, where, on August 4th, he was joined by Morari Rao in person. On that very day Haidar re-entered Bangalore. Haidar's first move was a night attack on the camp of Morari Rao at Hoskote; the attack was repulsed (August 22nd). Both armies now turned their attention to the advance of Colonel Wood. [31]

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29 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 64.
30 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 80.
31 As above.

Colonel Wood's movements over Salem, Attur, Dharmapuri, etc., 1768

Colonel Wood, had begun his task of reducing the lowland forts with the siege of Tenkaraikottai, which capitulated on the eve of assault on February 12th. Dharmapuri was carried by assault. The slaughter of the defenders was so severe that only one other garrison (that of Erode) dare face Wood's storming party. The forts of Salem, Attur, Sendamangalam and Namakkal surrendered without a blow. Wood then crossed the Kaveri, secured the plateau and penetrated to Palghat. He then received orders to join Smith in Mysore. Marching via the Toppur Pass, he reached Krishnagiri on September 1st. [32]

Offering the Cession of Baramahal, 1768:

Haidar, carefully concealing his movements, had taken up such a position at a bend of the defile up which Wood must march, that he could enfilade the advancing troops from chosen position and taking advantage of the ensuing confusion, annihilate the British force. As Smith advanced, he received early intelligence of the movements of Wood and Haidar, and realised that the latter could be trapped. He sent messengers to apprise Colonel Wood of his intentions. On reaching the corner of the defile, Smith and Haidar were startled by a regular salute which Colonel Wood thought proper, in honour of Colonel Smith. The warning was enough, Haidar withdrew and Smith and Wood joined their forces without opposition, but the chance of dealing the enemy a severe blow was lost. Haidar now offered the cession of the Baramahal and an indemnity of ten lakhs, as the price of peace. The terms were rejected. The Government were soon to repent their rashness in rejecting these proposals. [33]

Hosur Attacks, 1768:

The British army next moved on Kolar. Meanwhile Haidar recovered Mulbagal. On October 3rd Wood retook the Peta and failed at the Fort. On the following day Wood was attacked in force by Haidar, and barely escaped defeat.

On November 14th Smith set out from Kolar towards Venkatagiri kota with Muhammad Ali and two Deputies, with whom Government had thought fit to hamper the discretion of their Commander-in-Chief. On the first day's march of the Nawab's party, news was received that Haidar was attacking Hosur.

On November 16th Wood marched to the relief of Hosur. On the 17th he reached Bagalur and deposited there his baggage, camp equipage and surplus stores, with two brass 18-pounders, as a preliminary to a night attack on Haidar's camp. Wood started from

32 As above.
33 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 81.

Bagalur at 10 P.M. and reached Hosur at 7 A.M. on the morning of 18th. Haidar allowed him to enter the fort unmolested. It was not till 2 P.M. that the sound of firing to the north, convinced Colonel Wood of the situation. He hastily retraced his steps to Bagalur, but arrived too late. Haidar, without attempting an attack on the Fort, had entered the Peta, packed nearly the whole of the stores and baggage of the British army on his carts, tumbrils and gun-carriages and marched them off to Bangalore with the two 18-pounders. By the time Wood reached Bagalur nearly the whole of Haidar's army was out of sight. An awful panic in the Peta had resulted in the loss of over 2000 human lives and as many bullocks. [34]

On November 20th Wood returned to Hosur and gave the garrison what ammunition and stores he could spare. On the 21st he marched via Bagalur to Araleri, where he was attacked in force by Haider on the 22nd and 23rd and was only saved from annihilation by the arrival of Major Fitzgerald. Here on the 22nd and 23rd November Wood sustained a series of crushing reverses, which must have ended in complete annihilation had not Major Fitzgerald, by a forced march, come to his relief from Venkatagiri. Colonel Wood was in consequence sent under arrest to Madras, Colonel Lang assuming the command. [35]

Haidar being now temporarily disembarrassed of Colonel Smith, the only opponent whom he really feared, prepared to carry the war into the enemy's country. Early in November Fazl-ulla Khan moved by Gajalhatti and the Kaveripuram pass on Coimbatur, where almost every post fell into his hands. Having learnt by a despatch from Fazl-ulla Khan that his descent into Coimbatur would be completed by the 4th December, Haidar descended on the 6th December eastwards into the Barahmahal by the excellent pass of Palakod, and thence southwards through that of Thopur through a chain of hills running east and west, which at this place connects the first and second ranges of great mountains whose direction is north and south ; and Colonel Lang, who now commanded in Mysore, on receiving intelligence of this event, which had long been foreseen, detached in the same direction a light but efficient division, composed of 5,000 men of the best troops of the army, under Major Fitzgerald, which marched on the 10th. [36]

On December 6th Haidar himself marched into the Baramahal via. Palakodu and debouched on the Talaghat through the Toppur Pass. Four days later, Major Fitzgerald started in pursuit with a select force of 5000 men but he could not come up with Haidar. Colonel Wood's short-lived conquests in the Baramahal and Salem were garrisoned mostly by troops of the Nawob, without any mixture of English sepoys. Capture after capture was reported to Fitzgerald, Dharmapuri on December 6th, Tenkaraikottai on the 7th, Omalur

34 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 82.
35 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 82.
36 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 83.

12th, Salem 15h, Namakkal 17th, Karur 19th, Erode 25th, Dindigul 31st. Fitzgerald pushed straight for Trichinopoly. Lang fell back from Kolar on Vellore. Within six weeks Haider had won back every post that had been taken from him except Krishnagiri, Venkatagiri-kota and Kolar. [37]

Haidar in descending through the pass of Palakod was preceded by emissaries in every direction, who announced the intelligence of his having defeated and destroyed the English army, and of his approaching to re-occupy his own posts in the lower country preparatory to the conquest of Madras. The garrisons, with the exception of Erode and Kaveripuram, were composed, in various gradations of inefficiency, of the same materials as those which have been already described, excepting that in those of the provinces of Barahmahal and Salem, the garrisons were of Nawab's troops without any inter-mixture of regular English sepoys. They followed the same disgraceful fate as those in the province of Coimbatur, and fell as if a magic wand had accompanied the summons. Major Fitzgerald, who followed with rapid strides, had the mortification to hear, at each successive march of the surrender of the place which he next hoped to relieve. [38]

Haidar's intentions to seize Tiruchirappalli, 1769 :

Their surrender is reported by Fitzgerald on the following dates. On the 6th Dharmapuri, 7th Tenkaraikottai, 12th Omalur, 15th Salem, 17th Namakal, 19th Karur, 25th Erode, 31st Dindigul, Kaveripuram and Palghat are not mentioned in his dispatches. As he approached the Kaveri, he had intelligence that Haidar had crossed or was about to cross the river a little to the eastward of Karur, and had determined to leave Fazl-ulla to invest that place and Erode, and to proceed himself with the main army to attempt Trichinopoly, or levy contributions on Tanjore and the southern provinces. Deeming Erode to be safe for the present, from his knowledge that at least 200 Europeans, 1,200 regular sepoys, eight pieces of good battering cannon, and two mortars had been allotted for its defence, and knowing Trichinopoly to be in a defenceless state, from having been drained of its troops for the service of Coimbatur, he inclined to the eastward for the protection of that more important object. This movement determined Haidar to the opposite direction. Karur fell without much resistance, and he moved up the right bank of the Kaveri for the siege of Erode. [39]

The year 1768 closed with the capture of Erode and Kaveripuram, the former place being disgracefully surrendered by the same Captain Robinson whose breach of parole was referred above already.

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37 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 69.
38 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 70.
39 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 70.

Sir Thomas Rumbold (1736-1791) by George Romney

British Army Defeat Haider Ali - Dead Field

In six weeks from the commencement of Fazl-ulla Khan's operations, Haidar had regained all the territories which had been wrested from him in two campaigns, with the exception of Kolar and Venkatagiri, two untenable posts, and Krishnagiri where the garrison might remain safely perched on the summit of the rock without any probable influence on the future character of the war.

While Fazl-ulla Khan operated from Dindigul on Madura and Tinnevelly, Haidar bent his course along the northern bank of the Kaveri eastward ravaging Trichinopoly, exacted a contribution from the Raja of Tanjore as a ransom for his territory, and then marched northwards towards Cuddalore, the English retreating before him along the coast, while Colonel Lang fell back from Kolar and the Barahmahal on Vellore for the greater security of the metropolis. [40]

Haider invades the Carnatic and ends the First War, 1769:

Abortive negotiations for peace were then opened by the Government of Madras, in which, judging by the light of after events, it is pitiable to contrast the manly and statesmanlike demeanour of Haidar with the blindness of the dupes of the Nawab.

Hostilities were resumed on the 6th March, and, after a series of rapid movements, in which the masterly dispositions of Colonel Smith often embarrassed him. Haidar, when 140 miles south of Madras, suddenly despatched bulk of his whole army, guns, and baggage, through the Barahmahal by the Attur pass ; reserving for his purpose only 6,000 cavalry and 200 chosen infantry. Then eluding Colonel Smith, he marched 130 miles in three days and a half, took up his quarters at the Little Mount, 5 miles from Madras.

The Government at his request, sent out Mr. Du Pre to make terms, and the result was a most humiliating treaty, by which an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded. All prisoners and places taken during the war were to be given up, including a number of the relatives of Chanda Sahib and the former Nabob, who were prisoners in the hands of Mahommed Alli. Haidar Ali, appearing on the 29th March before Madras, when he again made overtures for peace, which, after some manoeuvring, was concluded on the 3rd of April. [41]

Haidar dictated peace on his own terms.[42] A treaty was signed on April 3, 1769, stipulating the mutual restitution of prisoners and places, and a mutual defensive alliance. This war, which had been provoked entirely by the Council of Fort St. George in breach of the orders and policy of the Court of Directors, thus ended in shame, and a large increase to the debt of the Company.

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40 Same as above.
41 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 71.
42 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 83.

Inscription on Battle of Porto Novo, 1781

Lieutenant Flint's deed of daring, 1780 by Henry Marriot

THE SECOND WAR OF MYSORE (1780 -1784)

Causes for the Second War of Mysore:

The treaty signed on April 3, 1769 stipulated for the mutual restitution of prisoners and places, and that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out. " This clause was important, as the British in after years undeniably broke faith, and the next war with Haidar was the fruit of their refusal to fulfil their obligations. [43]

The Second Mysore War is a tedious record of disaster from the British point of view. Marathas had for some time been meditating one of their periodical raids on Mysore, and, towards the close of 1769, Madoo Rao was in motion from Poona, on which Haidar, retreating as Madoo Rao advanced along the woody tract which skirts Bednore, sought protection in his capital in January 1770. Though he repeatedly called on the English to assist him, as by treaty bound, to repel the invasion, his demands were as persistently evaded, to the discredit of the Madras Government. The Marathas attacked Mysore in 1771. The war lasted upto June 1772, when Haidar, who had been severely handled at Chercolee, purchased peace by a large money payment and by the cession of a great portion of his dominions, which entailed on the English, as the fruit of their infraction of the treaty of 1769. [44]

But the British refused to honour the treaty of Madras and did not give support to Haider Ali. As a result, Haider Ali's territories were taken by Marathas. He had to buy peace with Marathas for a sum of Rs. 36 lakh and another annual tribute. This angered Haider Ali who hated the British. When the French attacked Mahe, a French possession under Haider Ali's dominion, he declared war on the English in 1780.

Up to the year 1780, when Haidar again made war on the English, he was again at war with the Marathas, with more success than in the preceding campaign. Between 1769 and 1779 he made repeated efforts, even going so far as to offer the provinces of Barahmahal, Salem and Attur, and twenty lakhs of rupees, as the price of their co-operation, to effect a proper understanding with the British, by whose persistent refusal he was driven into the arms of the Marathas.

When the English informed Haidar Ali of their designs on Mahe, a port in Malabar, where Haidar's authority was generally established, and where the foreign settlements

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43 Manual of Salem District, by H. Le Fanue, 1883, p. 71.
44 Same as above.

Sir Eyre Coote

were regarded by him as dependencies of his own, he gave the English to understand, in no doubtful language, the consequences of such action, and the war of 1780, though long premeditated on his part, and in any case inevitable, was precipitated by the capture of Mahe.

Mahe was captured in March 1779. Haider's resentment was so undisguised, that the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Rumbold, sent the Missionary Swartz to appease him. He treated Swartz with great respect, but nothing was gained except the most unequivocal evidence of his hostility. [45]

Haider's attacks on Arcot, Conjeevaram and other places, 1780-1781

For many months Haider made preparations for war on the largest scale, and at length, in July 1780, burst into the Carnatic through the Chengam Pass, and, advancing towards Madras, laid siege to Arcot. The main body of the English army under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hector Munro, advanced to its relief, while the brigade which had been sent to take possession of the Guntoor Sarkir, under Colonel Baillie, was hastily recalled, and directed to effect a junction with the Commander-in-Chief.

45 Same as above, p.72.

Then followed the dreadful disaster of the destruction of Baillie's force on the 10th September, at a distance of little more than two miles from that of Sir Hector Munro, and the subsequent precipitate retreat of the army to Madras. [46]

Haider's army, when he moved from his capital in June 1780, was composed of 90,000 effectives, 28,000 of whom were cavalry. He at first moved slowly, taking piecemeal, either by force or intrigue, all the Nabob's forts in the Carnatic. It was therefore the 21st August before he invested Arcot.

He determined to interpose a desert between him and his enemies, and the whole country from Pulicat as far south as Pondicherry, marked by a line to the west between 30 and 50 miles from the sea, was given up to fire and sword. A similar zone, thirteen miles on every side, was drawn round Vellore. [47]

Burke, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, thus describes this frightful episode:

"He became at length so confident of his force, so collected in his might, that he made no secret whatsoever of his dreadful resolution. Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and with every rival, who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation, he drew, from every quarter, whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the art of destruction, and compounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation, into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivities of the mountains. Whilst the authors of all these evils were idly and stupidly gazing on this increasing meteor, which blackened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. [48]

Then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war, before known or heard of, were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants, fleeing from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered, others without regard to sex, to age, to the respect of rank or sacredness of function—fathers torn from children, husbands from wives—enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers and the trampling of pursuing horses were swept into captivity in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade this tempest, fled to the walled cities ; but escaping from fire, sword, and exile, they fell into the jaws of famine."

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46 Manual of South Arcot, by J.H. Garstin, 1878.
47 Same, as above.
48 The Chingleput, Late Madras District, A Manual, by Charles Stewart Crole, p.193.

Black columns of smoke were seen from St. Thomas' Mount, on all sides, before any step whatever was taken to oppose the invader. Colonel Baillie, then commanding in Guntúr, Colonel Brathwaite in Pondicherry, and Colonel Cosby in Trichinopoly, were ordered im mediately to converge on the Presidency with their forces. The Commander-in-Chief was Sir Hector Munro, but it was at first proposed to give the command to Lord Macleod, a King's officer recently arrived from home with his regiment. The object of this was to retain the Chief at the Council table, where his vote was necessary to the Governor's majority. Lord Macleod proposed Madras as the point of concentration for the forces. Sir Hector was for Conjeveram, and, rather than give way on the question, he took the command himself, his absence being neutralised by the arbitrary appointment of an additional Councillor sure always to vote with the Governor.

On the 24th August, before Sir Hector Munro made his first march from the Mount towards Conjeveram, 42 miles distant, Colonel Baillie had arrived at Gummadipundi, 25 miles north of Madras. The Chief had 5,209 and Baillie 2,813 men. United, the force, which was composed of a large proportion of European troops, would have amounted to a formidable column of 8,022 men. The Chief however marched on, sending orders to Baillie to join him at Conjeveram, by way of Tripassur and Perambakam, a march of over 50 miles.

Haider, whose spies kept him informed of every thing, at once determined to avail himself of this initial error. He therefore moved off from Arcot suddenly, and took up an entrenched position at Musarvdkam, a village about 6 miles west of Conjeveram. [49]

On the 25th August, Colonel Baillie arrived on the north bank of the Cortelliar nearly opposite Perambákam, which lies about 14 miles to the north-west of Conjeveram. The river in question was then dry, but is one apt to rise suddenly if rain falls in the mountains. This it did the same night, and the British force was thus detained on the north bank until the 4th September, when it crossed, to find Tippu with a picked force of 6,000 horse, 5,000 foot, six heavy guns, and a large contingent of Irregulars, preparing for the attack.

Colonel Baillie seeing this, took up ground at Perambákam, and an indecisive engagement, which lasted three hours, took place on the 6th, the result of which was that the British Commander wrote to Sir Hector at Conjeveram, asking him to march to his aid, while Tippu sent to his father for reinforcements, without which, he said, he could not succeed. [50]

On the day on which this action was fought Haider had moved from his entrenched camp, so as to command the road by which such a junction must be effected. Sir Hector

49 Same, as above.

on the contrary remained inactive at Conjeveram during the 6th, 7th and 8th. Eventually he detached Colonel Fletcher with the flank companies of his army, consisting of two companies of the 73rd foot (Highlanders), two companies of European Grenadiers, and two of sepoy marksmen, to reinforce Colonel Baillie. This movement, which involved the additional blunder of further dividing his forces, succeeded better than it deserved, for, although the guides who were to take him to Perambákam, were in Haider's pay, Colonel Fletcher succeeded in reaching that place by suddenly ordering them to go by an unfrequented route, and Colonel Baillie was able to start from Perambakam during the night of the 9th with an augmented detachment of 3,720 men.

For the first five or six miles the opposition offered by the enemy was by harassing him with rockets and Irregulars, but it soon became more serious. Discipline and steadiness however prevailed, and the attacks of the enemy, who had availed themselves of every nullah and channel to throw up temporary works, were invariably repulsed. The force might yet, in spite of all, have reached Conjeveram had not Baillie, regardless of Fletcher's warnings, taken the fatal resolution to halt for the night. The morning of the 10th brought the dire result, for Haider's whole army was seen advancing under a distant cannonade. The British force now found itself in a defile studded with palmirah trees, and under the full force of a cross-fire poured into it from 50 guns. For a time the 10 cannons of the detachment replied with some effect, but the blowing up of two tumbrils of gunpowder in the middle of the hollow square into which it was formed caused such a panic, that, with most of his Europeans, like himself, wounded, Colonel Baillie saw farther resistance hopeless, and after forming the miserable remnant of his men into a square on a slight eminence, and from thence repelling thirteen attacks made by the enemy during another hour and a half, went forward waving his handkerchief to ask for quarter.

He was taken prisoner, but before orders could be issued by Haider some shots fired in panic by the sepoys, gave Haider's young soldiers the excuse for rushing upon the wreck of the British force and committing the most barbarous atrocities, which are thus described by Wilks:—"They amused themselves with fleshing their swords, and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled, on the sick and wounded in the dhoolies, and even on women and children."

The few who escaped were saved by French officers in Haider's service, especially M. Pimorin and M. Lally, brother of the besieger of Madras, but the fate for which they were reserved was to languish and die in confinement at Seringapatam.

In the meantime Sir Hector hearing the sound of the cannonade, had advanced till within two miles of Pullallúr, where this disaster took place ; but, according to his own

statement, he returned to Conjeveram on its sudden cessation, as he made up his mind that Baillie must have succeeded in driving off the enemies' forces, and would therefore be able to reach Conjeveram without his assistance.

This was by much the greatest disaster that had ever befallen the British arms in India. Sir Hector Munro, panic-stricken, after throwing his guns and heavy baggage into the large tank of the Siva Pagoda, retreated during the night of the 11th to Chingleput, being harassed all the way by the enemy's cavalry, and losing much of his remaining baggage.

At Chingleput, as at Conjeveram, he found none of those stores which the Nabob had promised to supply in abundance, but he was joined by Colonel Cosby and an important detachment. After hesitating whether to take ship from Sadras and so reach Fort St. George by sea, he finally determined to march through St. Thomas' Mount, which he reached without serious misadventure, although his retreat was followed by swarms of irregular horse. He finally entrenched himself on the banks of the Adyar river.

Haider returned to Musarvakam, which he called his "fortunate encampment," but quitted it on the 19th September to take Arcot, which bad been partially fortified in the meantime by the Nabob. This he did by assault after six weeks' siege. [51]

British Counter offensive, 1780

The Governor-General removed Mr. Whitehill, the incompetent Governor of Madras, and appointed Mr. Smith, the Senior Councillor, in his room, and sent down Sir Eyre Coote to take command of the troops. This energetic action, in the face of a panic which threatened to endanger the existence of the Company in the south, was followed by good results. Besides strongholds elsewhere, Haider had taken Karanguli, and Chingleput was also invested.

As soon as the news reached Calcutta Sir Eyre Coote was despatched to Madras, which he reached on the 5th November, but found the equipment of the army so wretched that he was unable to take the field till the 17th January, 1781. Meanwhile Haider had captured Arcot and laid siege to Wandewash and four other forts. Wandewash was successfully defended by Lieutenant Flint and a brother officer, with such romantic valour and such military skill that the siege be came one of the most honorable events of the war. Soon after, Sir Eyre Coote captured Caranguli; and on the 20th January marched towards Cuddalore.

Sir Eyre was unable, owing to want of transport, the result of the devastation of the country by the enemy's horse, to take the field until the 17th January 1781. Two days

51 The Chingleput, Late Madras District, A Manual, by Charles Stewart Crole, p.195-196.

afterwards he relieved Chingleput. The works of Karanguli fort had been improved by Haider, but on the 20th Captain Davis was despatched with 1,000 men to retake it. Although the information, that the enemy were evacuating it, turned out to be false, Captain Davis' orders to reduce it were peremptory, and after blowing open the gates, he captured the place, though not without considerable loss. The large store of provisions found in it was a valuable acquisition, but the chief gain was the improved tone which this success infused into the army, which regarded it as the first instalment of a tide of better fortune.

Sir Eyre Coote's operations during the next six months were in South Arcot, and included the relief of Wandewash, until the victory over Haider at Porto Novo on the 1st July 1781. [52]

Battle of Porto Novo, [53] 1781 and its importance

During 1781, Sir Eyre Coote had captured Caranguli ; on the 20th January marched towards Cuddalore. He reached Pondicherry in the beginning of February, and on the 6th of the same month Haider's army appeared in sight of the camp, also marching towards Cuddalore. Two battalions were immediately despatched to secure the passage of the Ariankupam river, and the same afternoon the army marched.

The two armies followed different roads only a mile apart. The enemy kept up a cannonade all night, which, however, produced little effect, and at daybreak the next day the English army reached Cuddalore. A French fleet was at this time lying off Pondicherry, and Haider entered into negotiations with the commander, but not choosing to accede to his demands for money, the squadron sailed away on the 7th. This relieved Sir Eyre Coote of his anxiety regarding provisions, which had run scarce, and enabled him to get supplies by sea. On the 8th he offered Haider battle, who declined it and drew off to the southward. For five months the army remained at Cuddalore, and during this time Haider recovered Tiagur. During its siege Sir Eyre Coote, towards the end of May, moved out to its relief, but after getting as far as Trivadi, and after being camped there for 2 days, returned to Cuddalore. The reinforcements which had been despatched by land from Bengal, on the news of Baillie's disaster becoming known in Calcutta, had by this time entered the Carnatic, and, to divert Haider's attention, Sir Eyre Coote marched to the southward on the 16th June, and two days after reached Chedambram, where there was a large fortified Pagoda, adjoining which was a big pettah surrounded by a mud wall. The garrison consisted of between 2,000 and 3,000 Poligars. In the evening the General sent 3 battalions to attack the pettah. The enemy after a scattered fire ran to shelter themselves in

52 The Chingleput, Late Madras District, A Manual, by Charles Stewart Crole, p.197.
53 Manual of South Arcot, by J.H. Garstin, 1878, p. 150-154.

the Pagoda. By some mistake, and without orders, the foremost battalion pursued them to the gates, which finding shut they brought up a twelve-pounder against them. The second shot burst open the outer gate. The sponge-staff was fired out of the gun in the hurry and the man who carried the match was not to be found. In this exigency Captain Moorhouse, of the Artillery, loaded and discharged the gun twice by means of a musket and made a breach in the second gate large enough to let one man in at a time. The sepoys rushed into the space between the two gateways which was in a moment full of them; they did not, however, observe midway between the two a flight of steps which led to the rampart. The garrison, every moment dreading the assault, called for quarter, but their voice was not to be distinguished in the general tumult which now ensued, for some straw having become ignited set fire to the clothes of the sepoys who were crowded between the gateways, and every one pressing back to avoid suffocation and the fire of the enemy, (which was now redoubled at the sight of their disaster), many of them were scorched and burned to death, and those who escaped hurried away without attempting to bring off the twelve-pounder. Six officers and nearly one hundred and fifty men were killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.

The General, who was in the pettah at the time, ordered some pieces of cannon to batter the wall. A fine brass eighteen-pounder was ruined without making any breach, and day beginning to dawn the troops returned to camp. All thoughts were now abandoned of taking the place by assault, and there being no battering guns with the army it was resolved to send for them to Cuddalore, and, after taking the rice out of the pettah, to proceed to Porto Novo to cover their landing. The army accordingly marched to Porto Novo on the 22nd. On the 24th Sir Edward Hughes arrived with the battering train, and while rafts were pre paring to carry it up the Coleroon, the Mysorean army appeared in sight of Porto Novo. Haider was preparing to besiege Trichinopoly when the commandant of Chedambram sent him word of his having beaten off the English and of their having retreated to Porto Novo. He marched 70 miles in two days, and on the night of the 27th reached Motapolliam, 4 miles west of Porto Novo. A. little before day break on the 1st July Sir Eyre Coote drew up his army on a large plain which lay between the two camps. On his right was a chain of sand-hills which ran along the coast at a distance of about a mile from the sea ; in the rear, and on the left woods and enclosures, but with an open space between ; two miles to the left ran another chain of sand-hills parallel to the former and behind them lay the principal part of the Mysorean army. At 8 o'clock the enemy opened fire from 8 guns, in two batteries which they had raised among the sand banks, but they were too distant to do much execution. The General, having reconnoitred their situation, saw that it was their wish that he should advance across the plain under the fire of the batteries they had constructed on every side so that their cavalry might be able to take advantage of the impression made by the guns: he therefore made no change in his disposition, but kept

his ground offering them battle until eleven o'clock, when, finding they did not choose to make the attack he moved to the rear of the sand-hills on his right. The army marched in two lines, the first commanded by General Munro the second by General Stuart. In the first were all the European Infantry with six battalions of Sepoys equally divided on the flanks; in the second four battalions of sepoys. One-half of the Cavalry formed on the right of the first, the other on the left of the second line. The baggage, guarded by a regiment of horse and a battalion of sepoys, remained on the beach near Porto Novo.

The army, after marching a mile between the sand bank and the seashore, again defiled by an opening into the plain where the enemy's artillery and infantry were drawn up, waiting the approach of the English army but their horse still remained behind the sand-hills. In an hour the whole of the first line got into the plain, where they formed under the fire of 40 picces of cannon. Not a shot was returned ; the guns were not even unlimbered, but every thing remained as if the army was going to continue its march. The enemy encouraged by this, which they attributed to an intention of escaping, brought their artillery nearer. Every shot now took effect. The General rode along the front encouraging every one to patience and to reserve their fire till they were ordered to part with it. He only waited accounts from the second line. An aide-de-camp from General Stuart told him that he had taken possession of the sand-hills. He immediately gave orders to advance and to open fire from all the guns. The artillery men, who had been so long restrained, now exerted themselves. Their fire was so heavy that nothing could stand before it. The Mysorean infantry only stayed to give one discharge, the drivers hurried away the cannon, while the horse attempted to charge, but were always broken before they reached the line. In a quarter of an hour the whole were dispersed. While the first line was engaged with Haider, the second was attacked by Tippoo and Lally, who were repulsed by General Stuart in all their attacks to drive him from the sand-hills, and when Haider fled they followed him. A deep water-courset saved the enemy from pursuit. The English army was 7,500 fighting men. A Portugese Captain, who deserted to the English during the action, and who pretended to have seen the returns, said that Haider had 300,000 or 400,000 fighting men. lt is certain that their numbers were so great that it would have been impossible to have brought the whole into action at once.

Significance of the Battle of Porto Novo:

The battle of Porto Novo was one of the most critical that was ever fought in India. Had the English army been broken and obliged to retreat, it would probably have been entirely destroyed by the multitude of cavalry by which it was surrounded, and the whole Carnatic would have been at Haider's mercy. It was afterwards known that Haider had given orders not to take any prisoners.

Decisive attacks by the British Forces under Sir Eyre Coote, 1781 and 1782

[54]After the battle at Porto Novo, in which Haider, considerably to his own surprise, was completely defeated, some days previously the siege of Wandiwash had been resumed by Tippu, who surrounded it with a complete line of circumvallation. Batteries were already in position when a message was received from Haider, announcing his defeat and directing Tippu to attempt the fort at once by escalade, and then to hasten off to intercept the advance of a British contingent arriving by land from Bengal.

Lieutenant Flint received information that the assault was to be made upon the night of July 16th. He was therefore fully prepared to oppose it, and opened a deadly fire of grape upon the enemy as soon as the sound of their approach was heard. A tumultuous noise followed the discharge, and gradually dwindled into silence. Other attempts were made on the same night, as well as on the following day, but all equally failed, and the demoralized condition of the army became so alarming, that Tippu struck his camp and marched to cut off the Bengal detachment. He, however, missed it by advancing along a route which it did not take, and had therefore the further disappointment of learning that a conjunction with Coote had been successfully effected.

Coote had earnestly hoped that this welcome addition to his army would have been accompanied by an almost more welcome addition of draught cattle, but he was disappointed, and it still appeared almost impossible to achieve the relief of Vellore, or to undertake the siege of Arcot, the two great objects now before him. By dint of the utmost exertions an advance was made to Tirupassur, which was taken. Haider retired to Pullalur, where he had annihilated the force under Colonel Baillie, his design being to bring on an engagement on the eleventh day of Ramzan, a day which had proved so auspicious for him in the previous year. It corresponded in this year with the 31st of August, but the battle took place four days earlier, and a dubious victory was gained by the English.

Coote continued pressed for want of means of transit, and consequently of provisions. Reports were, however, received that plenty reigned in the regions belonging to the Chittoor Poligars, and the Zemindars of Karvetnagar, Kalahastri, and Venkatagiri. The followers of the two former Zemindars had joined the invaders, while the lancers of Venkatagiri served with the British army; but as Haider's prospects of success grew more doubtful, his local allies considered it judicious to send assurances to the English camp that their adherence to the enemy had been forced upon them by their defenceless position, which was probably true. All held out assurances of assistance should the British army move into their territories. Sir Eyre Coote accordingly marched to Tirutani, in the Karvetnagar

54 Manual of the North Arcot District, By Arthur F. Cox, 1881, p. 62-69

Zemindari, and reduced the small fort of Polur in that neighbourhood, but the numerous foraging parties which ranged over the country met with but indifferent success. Coote's perplexity was increased by a pressing demand for relief from Colonel Lang, commanding at Vellore, who assured the general that a surrender was inevitable unless supplies could be thrown into the fort at an early date. Almost at the same time news arrived that Haider was at Sholinghur, strengthening a position to obstruct any attempted advance towards Vellore.

The resolution of Sir Eyre Coote to bring on a general battle was soon formed, and on September 26th the army marched seven miles in the direction of the enemy, having left a small garrison in Polur with the heavy guns and unnecessary equipage. On the following night torrents of rain fell, and rendered it next to impossible to move the tents. Haider, aware of this difficulty, concluded that Coote would make no movement on the 27th, and the draught cattle of the army were therefore permitted to stray to a distance in search of pasture, while many of his troops dispersed to bring in supplies.

Early in the morning of the 27th Coote had ridden out to examine the country, and unexpectedly came upon an advanced portion of the enemy established upon a long ledge of rocks. A brigade was at once called up, and the enemy dislodged. On mounting the ridge lately occupied by them, Haider's camp was clearly visible at a distance of about three miles to the south. The whole army was got into motion with the least practicable delay, and moved into position preparatory to an attack upon the Mysore camp.

"The country" writes Wilkes, "was comparatively open, but ridges and groups of rocks, irregularly scattered over the plain, and emerging to unequal heights, admitted of each party availing itself of the advantages of ground. Haider's main force was judiciously drawn up behind the crest of a long ridge, not rocky, its front covered with swampy rice fields, while his guns were placed on the summit of this ridge, or on commanding positions among the more advanced groups of rocks. Exclusive of the advanced corps in position, several detached bodies, exceeding in numerical strength the whole of the English army, were seen in motion towards each flank, and large masses of cavalry were collected on various points, evidently prepared to charge on an appointed signal. In fact the whole movement had operated as a surprise upon Haider." It is clear that he despaired of success from the very first. The best he hoped for was to save his guns, and to effect this object he resolved to sacrifice his cavalry. The advance of the English over the broken ground naturally destroyed at times the continuity of their line, and, seizing one of these opportunities, two large squadrons of horse charged at the gaps which appeared in the British ranks. Both were met, as they advanced, with volleys of grape from Coote's artillery, and when the English lines were reached, a destructive cross fire of musketry was poured upon the devoted squadrons from the troops who had in defiling naturally fallen

back at an angle to the main line, thus affording an excellent protection to the attacked flanks. One of the two charges was directly repelled, and rode back in confusion, but the other dashed through the ranks, pursued by volleys from the rear rank, which had faced about for the purpose.

Though these charges failed of success, they afforded time for Haider to have his guns limbered up and removed. The whole Mysore army was soon in rapid retreat, leaving but one gun for the English to capture. Coote's loss in the battle did not exceed one hundred killed and wounded, while on the side of the enemy it was calculated that upwards of five thousand must have fallen.

The distress of Vellore was daily becoming more critical, and though the Zemindars of Kalahastri and Karvetnagar had, after Haider's defeat at Sholinghur, deserted his cause and indulged in profuse promises of assistance, Coote found it impossible to obtain within their territories more than a scanty subsistence from day to day. It was rumoured, however, that large convoys of grain were passing at intervals down the Kallur ghaut to the Mysore army, and, on the chance of intercepting one of these, a detachment was sent on some distance to the west, under the command of Colonel Owen. This officer was attacked among the rocky hills south-east of Chittoor by nearly the whole of the Mysore army, commanded by Haider in person, but was able, with the loss of all his baggage, to extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had been surprised. Coote soon joined him, and by the beginning of November, a small surplus of grain was collected from among the Chittoor Paliems, and on the 3rd Coote was enabled to provision Vellore for six weeks. The operations against this fort, which was defended by Colonel Ross Lang, had continued almost without intermission since the commencement of the campaign, when a large detachment had been sent against the place under one Mir Sahib, and batteries were erected.

Sir Eyre Coote's advance from Madras about this time led Haider to withdraw most of his troops from Vellore, and the siege was from that time converted into a blockade. The scarcity of provisions became so great that grain sold at only two seers for a rupee at a time when money was far less plentiful than at present. Scanty supplies were brought in from the Chittoor Poligars by Mahommed Murad and his horsemen Redoubts were also erected, and mounted with guns in the neighbourhood of the paddy lands near the fort, and the ryots encouraged to cultivate.

During the blockade Colonel Lang resolved to create a diversion by attacking the hill fort of Kylasadrug, situated some six miles from Vellore. The pettah was carried by a night attack, and the hill being ascended, siege was laid to the drug. At daybreak however

the enemy received considerable reinforcements from Virinjipuram, and Colonel Lang sustained an utter defeat. His party was pursued down the hill in confusion, losing 30 men killed, and 40 wounded in the retreat.

The enemy now made the blockade still more complete, and intimidated the people of the neighbourhood by cutting off the noses of all such as were seized in the act of carrying provisions to the garrison, and driving them thus mutilated into the famine-stricken town. After provisioning Vellore, on November 3rd, Coote advanced to Chittoor and reduced its little fort, deemed important as it was reported to be a depot for provisions. It capitulated on November 11th after a defence of four days, but the intelligence regarding its importance as a depot was found to be false. The only consequence of its capture was that the general still further weakened his army by leaving a battalion in garrison, which was eventually sacrificed on the retirement of the army. The garrison left at Polur had also been forced to evacuate that fort, and on November 13th news arrived of a reverse at Pallipat, near Sholinghur, where another battalion, in charge of sick and wounded, was driven, it was suspected by the treachery of the Karvetnagar Zemindar, to retire into the jungle with the loss of its cannon and stores of grain.

As the rains were daily expected, it was now high time to return into cantonments near Madras.Though greatly enfeebled in health and much disheartened at the wretched equipment of his army, Sir Eyre Coote yielded to the urgent solicitations of the Madras Government to withdraw his resignation, and on January 2nd, 1782, once again joined the army. Three days later, while camped near Tirupassur, he was discovered senseless in his tent from an attack of apoplexy. His valuable life was however spared, and on the next day he was so far recovered as to be able to accompany his troops in a palanquin. The march was to Vellore, which was again in extremity. On the 9th the army prepared to cross the dry bed of the Poiny river, some two miles from its confluence with the Palur, when the enemy appeared and made a demonstration of opposing the passage. The caution and skill exhibited by Coote was, however, such that Haider desisted from the attempt. On the 10th two strong columns of the enemy again appeared, and opened a distant cannonade upon the army as it advanced across some wet paddy-fields. Haider was, however, powerless to check Coote's progress. On the 11th the convoy arrived before Vellore, and three months' provisions were passed into the fort. Colonel Lang joined Coote's army, and the defence of Vellore devolved upon Captain John Cuppage. On the 13th the army retraced its steps, and was once more opposed near the swampy ground, where the attack of the 10th had taken place. The heavy ground was passed with little loss, and a determined attack was then directed against Haider's forces, which were driven back and pursued till nightfall. The march to Tirupassur was diversified by a few empty demonstrations made by the enemy, but nothing noteworthy occurred.

It is remarkable that during the whole of 1781, although Coote was within easy marching distance of Chandragiri, he never advanced so far north as that place. It was still in possession of Abdul Wahab, the nabob's brother, but Coote appears to have been aware neither of its importance nor of the relationship of its killadar to Mahommed Ali. There is strong reason to suspect that Abdul Wahab had, before the war, entered into treasonable correspondence with the Mysore court, for letters were sent from Chittoor to Seringapatam before the invasion, and a vakil from the killadar was seen in Haider's camp soon after he entered the Carnatic. Haider appeared at that time to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Abdul Wahab, for a threatening message was returned through the vakil, which induced his master to abandon Chittoor and strengthen himself at Chandragiri. In .January 1782 Haider was able to undertake the reduction of this fort, and Abdul Wahab submitted without a struggle, though he had ample means for maintaining the defence. Haider agreed to permit him to retire with his family and goods to Madras, but as soon as the fort was given up, alleging some previous breach of faith on the killadar's part, treacherously sent the whole of his family prisoners to Seringapatam, retaining his two youthful daughters at Arcot.

During the remainder of 1782 the scene of war was removed to the west and south. Though the English suffered a notable defeat at Tanjore, Haider began to be very far from satisfied with the aspect of affairs, and determined to concentrate his forces, and move to the Western Coast. But previous to his departure he directed the destruction of most of the minor posts in the Coromandel which remained in his possession, and caused the defences of Arcot to be undermined. A few days before the mines were ready to be sprung his despondency was removed by the arrival of a French armament at Pondicherry. He hurried off to meet it, and the united forces, in the early part of 1782, captured Cuddalore and Peramukkal.

Sir Eyre Coote was deeply chagrined at the loss of these two places, and pronounced the condition of affairs to be not only embarrassing, but desperate. He determined to try the result of a general battle, and for that purpose advanced to Wandiwash, where Flint had for some days been surrounded by the combined armies of the allies. At the approach of Coote the enemy retreated to Pondicherry, whither the English army followed them ; but the Commander-in-Chief, being unwilling to risk a battle against superior numbers at a distance from his head-quarters, resolved to make some movement which should draw the enemy away from their ground. He therefore marched to Arni, which had been constituted the chief depot of the Mysore army in the Carnatic.

Lieutenant Flint had for some time been in secret treaty with the killadar, who had consented to allow the fort to be taken by surprise. Implicit reliance was not placed upon

the promise, but Coote was of opinion that, even should his assurances prove delusive, an attack upon Haider's depot would afford an opportunity of engaging the enemy upon more equal terms. On June 1st the army moved to within a few miles of Arni. Tippu had been detached by his father with a strong reinforcement, and was not far behind, for on the morning of the 2nd, as the English army renewed its advance, a distant cannonade was opened from various points upon its rear. The precise direction from which an attack might be expected could not be determined, and the troops were therefore engaged throughout the day in a series of fatiguing manoeuvres, without further result than the capture of one gun and eleven tumbrils of ammunition. Coote eventually gained the camping ground he had in the morning proposed to occupy, but not before Haider had dexterously detached a portion of his troops under Tippu, who succeeded in effecting the removal of the treasure and stores from the fort. This achieved, the Mysore army retired.

During the 3rd Coote made arrangements as though to lay siege to the fort, in the hope that the killadar might fulfil his engagements ; but the proximity of Haider prevented treachery, and on the 4th Coote abandoned his object, advancing against the enemy, who invariably retreated. On the 8th a skilful ambuscade was planned by Haider, by which the grand guard, under the command of a zealous but inexperienced young officer, was entrapped and surrounded, 166 men and two guns being captured. Coote's repeated challenges to the enemy having been thus declined, he retired for a time to Wandiwash to refresh his troops, after which he withdrew to Madras, and was forced to resign his command in consequence of the state of his health. Major-General Stuart, the officer next in seniority, succeeded.

Haider's health had also failed during this year, and on December 7th, 1782 he died in camp at Narsingarayanipet near Chittoor where a small monument marks the spot. His death was strictly concealed, and his body sent secretly to the tomb of his father at Kolar, while Tippu was urged, by means of expresses, to join the army without delay. Rumours of Haider's decease were, in spite of the attempt at concealment, widely spread, and the commandant at Vellore reported the fact as one to be relied upon, as early as December 9th, only two days after the event occurred. General Stuart however persisted in refusing to credit the rumour, and added that even if it were true, "the army would be ready to move in proper time." No movement was however made for sixty days after Haider's death.

Battles with Tipu

The golden opportunity for delivering a crushing blow while the Mysore army was in consternation, and before the heir apparent had returned, was thus lost, and the campaign was in consequence continued for four months. When the army did move, it advanced

Lord Cornwallis

with the utmost deliberation to Karunguli and Wandiwash, the fortifications of which places were destroyed under instructions from the presidency. Coote had been particularly anxious to preserve these forts, and even General Stuart, though at first acquiescing in the views of Government, subsequently expressed his regret at the precipitancy of the measure.

While in the neighbourhood of Wandiwash an attempt was made by the general to bring on a general action, but Tippu declined the battle, and soon after, hearing of the alarming proceedings of the English on the Western Coast, withdrew from the Carnatic. Before leaving he demolished two sides of the fortifications of Arcot, and destroyed every other important post which he held in the country, with the exception of Arni, in which he left a garrison. General Stuart had an excellent opportunity of securing Arcot. Arriving there on his march, he found the place abandoned by its garrison, but contented himself with sending word to Mahommed Murad, at Vellore, to come and take possession as killadar. As soon as the army advanced, and before Mahommed Murad could occupy the fort, one Sultan Jung, a russeldar of the enemy, entered it with a large force.

Mahommed Murad contented himself with employing the thousand recruits, whom he had enlisted, in reducing both the upper and lower forts of Satghur.

It was expected that the veteran Coote would return from Bengal in April 1783 and resume command of the Madras army. He arrived on the 24th, but the improvement which had been observable in his health during his sea voyage to Calcutta had been neutralized by the anxiety and exposure to which he had been subjected while returning, when the vessel in which he sailed had a narrow escape of being captured by some French ships of the line. He landed greatly reduced in strength, and expired two days later.

General Stuart was thus confirmed in his command, and conducted some most unsatisfactory operations against the French near Cuddalore. Fortunately the war in Europe was concluded by a peace between the two nations, and General Stuart, being recalled to Madras, was placed under arrest for his incapacity, and contempt of the authority of the presidency, and eventually sent back to England.

Analysis of Eyre Coote's engagements:

[55] In January following (1782) Vellore had again to be revictualled, and Sir Eyre Coote, although about to resign and suffering from ill health, determined to undertake its relief in person. When with the army a little beyond Tripassur his servants found him on the 5th in his tent, insensible from an attack of apoplexy. The Madras Government, alive

55 The Chingleput, Late Madras District, A Manual, by Charles Stewart Crole, p. 199.

to the great risk which his life was running, urged his being sent down to the Presidency. Their astonishment was great when they heard that he had started on the following day in a palanquin for Vellore, which he relieved on the 9th, and it was increased when they saw him return safe to Madras soon after, Haider having been afraid to risk a battle.

There now ensued an open rupture, which had been for a long time brewing, between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney, arising from alleged interference with his authority as Commander-in-Chief not only of Madras, but of all India. The correspondence which followed was characterised by much irritating personality and insinuation, and the want of cordiality which ensued contributed not a little to the ill-success which attended Sir Eyre Coote's operations in South and North Arcot in the middle of the year.

Hearing that Tippu, who was commanding a separate force before Wandewash, had suddenly decamped, and correctly surmising that his intention was to intercept reinforcements then on their way from Bengal in the same way as he had cut off Colonel Baillie, Sir Eyre hurried up the coast through Chingleput and the Mount in order to circumvent him. Tippu prepared ambuscades and erected works to arrest his progress on the road between Madras and Nellore, to the west of the Pulicat Lake. He forgot that, although it is broken by inlets which connect the lagoons with the sea, it was possible to march up the coast as the inlets could be forded, and he thus allowed Sir Eyre to slip past him on the other side of the Pulicat Lake unobserved, and effect a junction with the forces from the north, which added nearly one-third to the strength of his army.

The British commander then marched to reduce Tripassur, 33 miles from Madras on the road to Arcot. He used Poonamallee, which had been already retaken, as a basis for supplies. He appeared before it on the 19th August, and on the 22nd was preparing to storm a breach which had been made, when offers of capitulation on terms were made. A refusal had already been given, when the army of Haider was discovered in full march to its relief. Not a moment was lost. The storming party was ordered to advance, and were actually leaving the trenches when the place surrendered, and Haider drew off.

It should have been mentioned that he had in the interval re established himself in his lucky camp at Musarvákam. In pursuance of the superstitious feeling which led him to return there, he now determined to try conclusions with Sir Eyre Coote in a battle at Pullallúr, on the same ground which had witnessed his great success the year before. He also chose the same Mahommedan date, the 11th of the month Ramzan, which this year, however, really corresponded with the 31st of August. His astrologers predicted for him a complete victory, and he on his part left nothing undone, by study of the ground and temporary works, to make failure impossible. The British left Tripassúr on the 26th

August, and arrived at Perambákam on the same day. About 9 A. M. on the 27th, the advanced guard found themselves occupying the same ground as that on which Colonel Baillie made his fatal halt on the night of the 9th September 1780. The enemy was soon seen advancing in front and on both flanks. The fight continued for several hours, at the end of which Sir Eyre Coote, by seizing the village of Pullallur with his first line, turned the enemy's left flank, a success which he followed up by rolling back Haider's right flank with his second line, thus forcing him to retreat. The British encamped that night on the ground abandoned by the Mysore troops. The latter, however, claimed it as a drawn battle. The British force of 11,000 men had but 421 casualties. The enemy lost 2,000 out of a total force of 80,000.

Death Of Haidar Ali, 1782

The remainder of the year 1782 was barren of events. Haider's attention was turned chiefly to the campaign in Malabar, the conduct of which had been entrusted to Tippu. Events folowed after the death of Haider Ali, in1782, Haider had for some time been in failling health, but the news of his death from carbuncle at Vellore on the 7th December 1782 came upon all parties as a surprise.

It was at first kept a profound secret by his ministers, Purniya and Kishan Rao, in order to give Tippu time to come up and assume the sovereignty, but the fact leaked out in various ways and came to the ears of the Madras Government. They urged upon the new Commander-in-Chief, General Stewart, to take advantage of the confusion which an attack on the Mysore camp would cause, but he in the most unaccountable way refused, probably infeeble imitation of his predecessor's resistance to, what he deemed, dictation.

The death of Haidar on the 7th December 1782 brought no conclusion to military undertakings, which were however diversified by the operations on the West Coast, whereby attention of Tipu was called off from the Coromandel, where Said Sahib was left to co-operate with the French, while the Sultan in person attended to his interests in the opposite direction.

Conclusion Of Second Mysore War:

Tidings of peace in Europe resulted in a convention for the cessation of hostilities between M. Bussy and General Stuart on the 2nd July 1783 ; but the strife with Tipu continued upto the 11th March 1784, when a nominal peace ensued which lasted up to the war of 1790, which was brought about chiefly through Tipu's attack on Travancore, which the British held themselves bound to defend.

Portrait of Medows by Robert Home

Haider Ali died in 1782 and the war was continued by his son Tipu Sultan. Sir Eyre Coote, ended the war inconclusively with The Treaty of Mangalore. The Treaty was signed on March 11, 1784 and under it the status quo ante was restored. The Company was not in position to claim a foot on Salem soil. [56]

56 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p.83

THE THIRD WAR OF MYSORE (1790-1792)

Causes For The Third Mysore War:

[57]At the end of December 1789, Tipu Sultan, son of Haidar Ali, attacked the Travancore Lines and was beaten off. In April 1790, he carried them by storm. Thus began the Third Mysore War. The English formed an alliance with the Marathas and Nizam to curb Tipu's aggresiveness.

The war commenced on the part of the English by a double attack, the one under Colonel Kelly from the centre of the Coromandel through the Barahmahal, and the other under General Medows from Trichinopoly, operating in the first instance against Dindigul and Coimbatur. The latter met with much opposition, Tlpu in person assuming the command and some severe actions being fought.

Medow's Campaigns, Struggle against Tipu's tactics, 1790

[58] The first stage of the War was mostly confined to operations in Coimbatore and Salem. General Medows left Trichinopoly on May 26th seized Karur on June 15th and proceeded to reduce the fortresses scattered over Coimbatore in detail. Coimbatore itself was occupied without resistance on July 21st. Erode fell on August 6th, and Dindigul on August 23rd. A force was sent against Palghat and another against a body of 4000 horse which Tipu had posted in the country for observation. This force was driven up the Gajalhatti Pass and Satyamangalam was surprised and taken. But these operations had split Medows Army into three divisions between Palghat, Coimbatore and Satyamangalam. Tipu, hitherto inactive, now began to move. On the second September at the head of 40000 men he left Seringapatnam, passed south through the Gajalhatti Pass (September 11) and crossed the Bhavani river (September 12th). The moves and counter moves of the next few days compelled Medows to return from the line of the Bhavani to Coimbatore.

Meanwhile, Tipu marched on Erode which at his approach was evacuated (September 25th).

By this move he recovered several of the places taken, and inflicted several minor reverses on the British arms.

57 49. Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p.83.

58 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p.84.

Maxwell's Advances, 1790

Meanwhile a second English field force, 9,500 strong, had concentrated at Arni under Colonel Kelly. On September 24th that officer died, and the command devolved on Colonel Maxwell.

By this time, Tipu marched on Erode and by this move he recovered several of the places taken and inflicted several minor reverses on the British arms when the second English force, 9500 strong had concentrated at Arni under Colonel Kelly. As the officer died and the command devolved on Colonel Maxwell, exactly a month later, on October 24th Maxwell entered Tipu's territory near Vaniambadi and on November 1st he approached Krishnagiri. He fixed his head-quarters at Kaveripatnam.

As soon as Tipu heard of Maxwell's advance, he started post-haste for the Baramahal. By November 9th Tipu's light cavalry reached Kaveripatnam. On the 9th the presence of considerable bodies of light cavalry indicated the Sultan's approach, and on the 11th the only regiment of cavalry, allowing themselves to be inveigled in pursuit through a defile, were attacked by about six times their number and driven back with considerable loss.

On the 12th the Sultan showed his army in full force, and attempted by a variety of evolutions to find the means of attacking Colonel Maxwell with advantage; but the strong position assumed by that officer, his admirable dispositions, and his promptitude in anticipating every design, frustrated these intentions, and the Sultan drew off at night without any serious attempt. The same manoeuvres were repeated on the 13th and 14th . Similar means on the 13th, varied so as to compel an entire change of position, terminated in the same manner. On the 14th, numbers further augmented made similar demonstrations, but these were actually intended to conceal his meditated departure on the ensuing day.

Later on in the year the Sultan, receiving tidings of the invasion of the Barahmahal, crossed the Kaveri to the northward, leaving a fourth of his army under Kamr-u-din to watch General Medows, who crossed into Salem below Erode to succour Colonel Maxwell, who, by Colonel Kelly's death on the 24th September, had succeeded to the command of the other division.

In conformity to orders from General Medows, that officer entered the Barahmahal on the 24th of October in pursuance of the original plan of the campaign. On the 1st of November he approached Krishnagiri, the capital and strongest post of the district. The natural strength and improved defences of this tremendous rock rendered it of some importance to determine whether a regular siege should be attempted, and several days were expended in a close and minute examination of its whole circumference. Colonel

Maxwell then established his head-quarters near the central position of Kaveripatnam, intending, as was supposed, by making demonstrations towards the pass and the fort in its vicinity, to return and attempt Krishnagiri by surprise.

Medows in pursuit of Tipu, 1790

As said, Tipu marched on Erode and by this move he recovered several of the places taken and inflicted several minor reverses on the British arms. A second English force, 9500 strong had concentrated at Arni under Colonel Kelly. On September 24th the officer died and the command devolved on Colonel Maxwell. Exactly a month later, on October 24th Maxwell entered Tipu's territory near Vaniambadi and on November 1st he approached Krishnagiri. He fixed his head-quarters at Kaveripatnam.

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Meanwhile Medows had started in pursuit of Tipu. General Medows had crossed the Kaveri on November 8th. He commenced his march from the Kaveri on the 10th. On the 14th he encamped at the southern extremity of the pass of Thopur. On the following day, the 15th, it was enabled, by the improvement of the road effected by the Sultan a few days before, to dear the pass and the range of hills, and encamp on their northern face on an elevated ground over looking Barahmahal, and distant about twenty-nine miles from Colonel Maxwell's position at Kaveripatnam. Here a camp was espied, six miles away.

On the arrival of the advanced guard at the intended ground, a camp was observed gradually to arise, flags to be erected, and troops to take up their ground on the plain, distant about six miles. Nearly three weeks having elapsed since any direct intelligence had been received from Colonel Maxwell, no doubt was entertained that the English army beheld their comrades, and three signal guns were fired to announce the event. In five minutes every tent was struck, and heavy columns were seen in full march to the west in the vale of the great pass of Palakad. It was soon understood to be the Sultan's army. He had drawn off some miles south from Colonel Maxwell's position on the preceding evening, and, calculating on General Medows requiring another day to clear the pass, had marked an encampment which he found it prudent to abandon. General Medows moved on the 16th fifteen miles farther in the direction of Kaveripatnam, and, on the ensuing day, Medows now realised that he was in sight of Tipu's army. He did not give pursuit, his junction with

Governor General Wellesley

A view of the gathering in France to view the ambassadors of Tipu Sultan in 1788

Maxwell, was more important. This was effected on the l7 th at Pula-halli. 12 miles south of Kaveripatnam and the important junction was formed by Colonel Maxwell.

The united army was now twenty miles from the head of the pass of Thopur and twenty-six from its southern extremity. Kishen Rao, the treasurer, was alone admitted to the Sultan's councils on this occasion. He had no fixed opinion regarding the plan of future operations intended by the English after the disruption of their chain of depots ; but he inferred that wherever the Sultan should go they would follow, and that he ought accordingly to carry the war into their own country, keeping also in view such a line of operation as might enable him to avail himself of any favourable opportunity to recover the places he had lost. If he should be followed up the vale of Palakad, the nature of the ground left him no alternative but to ascend the ghat; and he determined to double back through the pass of Thopur. His cattle had been much overworked on the 15th, and it was deemed necessary to give them two complete days rest. His intelligence stated the intention of the English general to halt on the day ensuing the junction ; but if such an intention existed, it had been changed.

The two armies were accordingly in motion on the 18th, both pointing to the pass of Thopur and both intending to dear it in two easy marches. Tipu now decided to double back through the Toppiir pass, and try his fortune in the Carnatic. On the lSth both armies were in motion, both pointing to the Pass of Toppur, and both intending to clear it in two easy marches. The two armies were actually preparing to encamp within four miles of each other, before they discovered each other's presence. Tipu's columns had entered the pass by the time the main body of the English army, arrived on the camping ground.

Colonel Stuart, who commanded the right wing of the army and led the column, perceiving soon afterwards from a commanding ground the probability of being able by a rapid advance to cut off a considerable body of the Sultan's infantry and attack the remainder to advantage while entangled in the pass, reported his observations, and asked permission to attempt it with his own wing of the southern army, as an advanced corps, to be supported as occasion might require. This proposition was not approved, and the corps on the right under General Medows, impeded by ravines, was making slow progress. The demonstrations were continued, and the effect of a more rapid advance was sufficiently evinced by the fact of three battalions of infantry of the rear of the main column being intercepted under all these disadvantages of delay, and forced to make a straggling retreat through the ravines and woods in the opposite direction. The remainder of the Sultan's army, astonished at their good fortune, completely cleared the pass, with the loss of only one tumbril, which had broken down, and some unimportant articles of military store. The cavalry disappeared about sunset, a small body taking the route of the pass, and the

Bengal Army Sepoys Storming of Seringapatam on 4th May 1799 in the Fourth Mysore War

Cannon used to defend Seringapatam Fortress Storming of Seringapatam
on 4th May 1799 in the Fourth Mysore War

remainder in a circuitous direction by Pennagaram ; and the English army, after a tedious march of twenty miles in about fifteen hours, and firing a few shot, encamped at night near the summit of the pass of Thopur."

lt was a golden opportunity for cutting olf a portion of the enemy's infantry, and attacking the remainder while entangled in the Pass. Medows let the chance slip. Tipu's army cleared the Pass. with the exception of three infantry battalions in the rear of the main column, which were intercepted and compelled to retreat in the opposite direction, and the majority of the cavalry which disappeared towards Pennagaram, and rejoined the main body by a circuitous route some days later. Tipu held on without halting for Trichinopoly, and Medow's' campaign was rendered abortive.

As the Quartermaster-General's department was preparing, under the protection of the advanced guard, to mark out the new encampment, they perceived a few tents pitched three or four miles in front of their right. It was Tipu's Pesh Khana, or tents always sent on for his personal accommodation with the advanced guard. The circumstances were reciprocally reported, and the Sultan, confident in the powers of his equipments, rashly decided on continuing his march through the pass. By the time that the head of the main column of the English army had reached the intended encampment, thick clouds of dust in front indicated the entrance into the pass of a long and heavy column, while a considerable body of horse made a demonstration on the right, and was supposed to mask a movement of infantry, indicated by columns of dust in the rear of their left, which seemed, however, to accurate observers to be returning to the westward. The general, with a brigade of infantry and the cavalry, moved out to examine this body, while the head of the column of march was ordered to regulate its advance by that of the corps which the general directed.

To one acquainted with the lie of the ground over which this retreat was conducted, the omission by General Medows to harass and destroy the enemy while entangled in the pass appears to be open to censure. All the advantages would have been with the pursuer, as for nearly six miles the fugitives would have been exposed to an almost vertical fire to which they could have made no effective return. The diagnosis of General Stuart appears to have been correct, and even had General Medows apprehended danger on his right and rear from the body which afterwards escaped towards Pennagaram, it would have been in his power to make ample disposition to meet this difficulty without detaching from his main body to such an extent as to impair its efficiency for the pursuit through the pass.

There is the less excuse for this omission as General Medows had himself marched through the pass- not long before and must have been aware of the advantage which it offered to a pursuing enemy.

"On the Sultan's part, the discovery of the English advanced guard was made in sufficient time for the baggage, camp equipage, and rear-guard to return, separated from the army by the intervention of the whole of the British forces, and the dust of their retrograde movement contributed to the hesitation of the English general. The Sultan was personally present with the cavalry which made the demonstration on the right, and went off with a slight escort through the pass shortly before it disappeared. The Pesh Khana was the only cover in the whole army, and they were equally destitute of provisions until joined by Kamr-u-din and his small bazaar two days afterwards. Tipu however made no delay, his army supplying themselves by the plunder of his own villages ; and first pointing to Karur, and giving out that he would cross the Kaveri below that place, he descended by the northern bank of the river, and made no halt until opposite Trichinopoly. Against that place he made various demonstrations, but they had no material result beyond the plunder and devastation of the island of Seringam."

General Medows was now called off to Madras to meet Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, who arrived there on the 12th December; and Tipu, foiled at Trichinopoly, marched, devastating as he advanced, through the Coromandel via Tiagardurgam and Trinomalai, and thence by Permacoil towards Pondicherry.

Still, with the exception of Krishnagiri, everything essential to the communication with the Coromandel and Barahmahal to the south-east and east was already secured, and Lord Cornwallis considered himself at liberty to turn his attention to the north-east, where Nandidrug was captured on the 19th October. The absence of the Governor-General in that direction suggested to the Sultan the advantage of making a diversion elsewhere, and Lord Cornwallis was again called to the south-east by an alarm for his communications.

Campaign of Cornwallis, 1791

After arrival of Lord Cornwallis in Madras, English had a definite objective, namely Seringapatnam. The Governor-General concentrated at Vellore on February 10th.

The Governor-General had arrived on the 11th February 1791 at Vellore, and was threatening the Barahmahal through the Ambur pass, when the Sultan, learning this, marched hastily via Changam and Palakod to meet him, and, had the attack been made by the route anticipated, would have been in time to forestall it ; but the feint on Ambur had served to cover the real design, which was to ascend via the Mugli pass, whence the English troops advanced by way of Kolar and Hoskota on Bangalore, which was stormed on the 21st March.

Cornwallis had feigned the invasion of the Baramahal. On the 28th Kolar fell. Bangalore was stormed on March 21st and on May 4th. Cornwallis started for Seringapatnam but

returned to Bangalore due to setting of rains. By July he began a series of operations for the reduction of Tipu's outlying forts.

Lord Cornwallis, after the requisite arrangements at Bangalore, where the talents and military skill of Captain Read had succeeded in bringing forward the most important supplies without any loss, although greatly interrupted by the enemy's detachments, moved in a south-eastern direction to Hosur, which was evacuated and imperfectly blown up on his approach ; fortunately a train laid for the magazine, and intended to explode after the entry of the English troops, did not succeed. Thence he moved in the direction of the passes of Palakad and Rayakota for the purpose of reducing the congeries of droogs which command the access to these passes from above as well as from below.

Hosur, Anchetti-durgam, Nilagiri, Ratnagiri were taken without resistance. Under Major Gowdie, Rayakota lower fort was stormed on July 20th and the upper fort surrendered two days later. At the same time Hudedurgam and other small hillorts capitulated. Garrisos were placed in Rayakota, Anchettidurgam and Hudedurgam. The other places were dismantled. In September the British directed their efforts to reducing the country north of Bangalore.

The possession of these posts would accomplish the double purpose of opening a free communication for his own supplies from Coromandel and protecting the Company's possessions from the inroads of small divisions of cavalry, by occupying all the direct roads from Seringapatam to Barahmahal. An advanced brigade under Major Gowdie had some sharp service at Raya kota, the chief of these droogs, garrisoned by 800 men. He forced the lower works shortly before daylight by blowing open a gate, and hoped to carry the rock by entering with the fugitives ; he succeeded in carrying several successive gates, but found it imprudent to attempt the summit. He had been instructed to withdraw in the event of not completely succeeding in his first enterprise, but perceiving a probability of ultimate success, he ventured so far to deviate from his orders as to hold his ground in an intermediate line of works about half-way up the hill, and the place capitulated on the appearance of the army. The minor poets, all capable of protracted defence, offered various but unsuccessful degrees of resistance ; some of them, favoured by local circumstances, stood the assault, and the garrisons escaped by the opposite descent into the woods. His lordship had it also in contemplation to adopt some arrangement for blockading Krishnagiri, the capital of Barahmahal, a place deemed impregnable according to regular means, which, although not commanding any road, was capable with a large garrison of interrupting the transit of convoys ; but he was called from this vicinity by causes which had not been entirely unforeseen."

[59] In October 1791, a diversion was caused in the Baramahal by one Bakir Sahib, son of venerable Killedar of Dharwar. He descended with a force into Coimbatore and entered Baramahal by the Toppur Pass. Colonel Maxwell was despatched against him. The plunderes had ensconced themselves and their captives in the fort of Pennagaram. Colonel Maxwell appeared before the fort on October 31st and called on the garrison to surrender.

In reply the flag of truce was fired upon. Of the garrison two hundred men were killed. Bakir Sahib soon found the Baramahal untenable and retired via Chengam to Coromandel.

Maxwell now proceeded to Krishnagiri and seized the Peta by surprise on November 7th. Soon afterwards Maxwell rejoined the main army and was again preparing for the march on Seringapatnam. Tipu was brought to his knees before the end of February and a peace was ratified on March 19th which stripped Tipu of half his dominions and crippled him with a fine of over thirty million rupees. By this Treaty, the whole of Salem District except Hosur Taluk came under the Company's rule.

A force under the said Bakir Sahib, an active young officer and son of the venerable killadar of Darwar, had been detached by the route of Coimbatur and Thopur into Barahmahal, with a respectable reinforcement for Krishnagiri, with orders to act on the communications of the English army, and particularly to sweep off in a southern direction the population and cattle of the whole district.

Colonel Maxwell, with a suitable division of the army, was detached for the purpose of endeavouring to disperse these intruders, and in descending the ghat, he received intelligence that a portion of the enemy had proceeded in the execution of their barbarous purpose of carrying off the population to Pennagaram, a post in the angle formed with the main range of mountains by the cross chain of Thopur, whence only a mountain pass communicates farther south. He moved with rapidity in that direction, and demanded the surrender of the place by a regular summons ; but the enemy, not satisfied with a simple refusal, fired upon the flag. As the appearance of the works justified prompt measures, it was instantly assaulted and carried by escalade with little loss to the assailants; but of the garrison, two hundred men were killed before the indignation of the troops could be restrained, and the cavalry escaped by the mountain paths. The activity of Colonel Maxwell's movements, from the accurate local information he had acquired in the previous campaign, soon induced Bakir Sahib to withdraw from a country too much bounded for the safe operations of cavalry. He descended by the pass of Changama into Coromandel, but finding, from the presence of the English cavalry under Colonel Floyd, that any enterprise towards Madras would be hazardous, he turned southward and re-entered the Maisur dominions by the pass of Attur.

59 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p.86

Analysis of Colonel Maxwell engagements[60]

Colonel Maxwell had been ordered, if he found the enterprise advisable, to attempt the destruction of the town within the lower fort of Krishnagiri, for the purpose of depriving the enemy as much as possible of cover for their predatory arrangements ; and, after effecting his objects in other parts of the province, he encamped on the 7th of November within a few miles of the place, without any other demonstration than that of reascending the pass. He moved at ten at night in three divisions, and carried the lower fort by escalade. The officers commanding the divisions were instructed, if appearances were favourable, to follow up the blow and ascend the rock with the fugitives, who had barely time to shut and barricade the gate ; and so dose was the pursuit, that a standard of the regular troops was taken on the very steps of the gateway. The bearers of the ladders were not so expeditious in their ascent, and the garrison, more numerous than their assailants, began to hurl the dreadful missiles of granite. Projections of rock afforded cover to the assailants, and repeated attempts were made during two hours to apply ladders, which were as often crushed with those who bore them ; and Colonel Maxwell at length found it necessary to desist from the assault with considerable loss. The garrison sallied on their retreat, but it was conducted with so much regularity that they quickly returned. The English troops, after setting fire to the town, withdrew before daylight, and the detachment soon afterwards returned to head-quarters, having moved along the back of the range between the passes of Palakod and Peddanaikandurgam, for the purpose of restoring a number of minor posts to the families of their former Hindu possessors."

The remaining operations terminated in the siege of Seringapatam and treaty of 1792, by which, amongst other cessions of territory, the whole of the present district of Salem, the Hosur Taluk excepted, fell to the English, the Coromandel thereby obtaining the second line of ghats as an iron boundary on the west, with its frontier fortress of Rayakota on the tableland of Maisur.

THE FOURTH WAR OF MYSORE, 1799

Causes for the Fourth War:

The undisguised hostility of Tlpu and his intrigues for a French alliance drove Lord Mornington to the extremity of entering on a fresh war in the commencement of the year 1799, before doing which he more than once gave the Sultan opportunities to conciliate peace by timely concessions.

These were either altogether disregarded or noticed with contempt, and when at last, waking from his infatuation, he sent an escort to Hosur to receive Major Doveton, the expected envoy, the step, if sincere, was too late, as the army of retribution was already on the march.60

The events of the Fourth Mysore War, 1799:

The attack was two-fold ; from the west though Coorg, under Lieutenant-General Stuart, and the east under General Harris. Colonel Brown in Coimbaiur and Colonel Read, the first Collector of Salem and the Barahmahal, had each an adequate corps at their disposal to secure the due supply of the advancing troops. The earlier progress of General Harris was unopposed by the Sultan, who had proceeded in force in the opposite direction, where he was defeated at Sedaseer by General Stuart, and thence proceeded on the 11th March to Seringapatam en route to oppose the more formidable array of the Commander-in-Chief. The winding route of the army under General Harris, from the vicinity of Arcot, was continued through the vale of Ambur and the province of Barahmahal, whence it ascended the ghats, and encamped within the English frontier, near Ratyakdta, on the 4th of March.

After entering the enemy's country on the 5th with one of the divisions, some days were necessarily occupied in reducing that portion of the congeries of hill-forts in the vicinity of Rayakota, which the treaty of 1792 had left in possession of the Sultan ; and on the 7th the head-quarters were established at Kelamangalam, about sixteen miles within the territory of Mysore. On the 9th the whole army was collected on that ground and made its first united movement on the enemy's country on the 10th, the day which General Harris had indicated to General Stuart as the latest which, if possible, his arrival before the enemy's capital ought to be protracted.

The route of the Commander-in-Chief lay on the 11th, 12th and 13th through the Balaghat Taluk of Hosur, and thence on the 14th to within nine miles of Bangalore, whence

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60 Manual os Salem District, By H.Le Faune, 1883, p.79

he marched, via Kankanhalli, towards Seringapatam, which fell on the 4th May, exactly one month after the investing force first encamped against it. In the division of territory which followed on the capture of the capital and the death of the Sultan, the Balaghat Taluk of Hosur was added to the English possessions, thereby completing the catalogue of vicissitudes whereby the present district of Salem came to form an Indian collectorate.

Analysis of the Fourth War:

In the last Mysore War, Tipu's whole force did not exceed 33000 foot and 15000 horse. His territory was invaded from Coorg by General Stuart with 6400 men, from the Baramahal by General Harris with a well equipped army of nearly 30000. Colonel Read, the first Collector of Salem, secured abundant supplies for the advancing troops. On the 28th February 1799, this army encamped at Karimangalam. Thence it proceeded via Palakodu and to Rayakota, where it encamped on March 4th. Hostilities began on the 5th, when a detachment under Major John Cuppage occupied without resistance the small hill forts of Nilagiri and Anchettidurgam. Hudedurg surrendered to Lt. Col. Oliver on the 7th and Ratnagiri was occupied after slight resistance on the 8th. Meanwhile on the 7th General Harris had established his head-quarters at Kelamangalam and by the 9th his whole army was collected there.

At this moment, Tipu was at Maddur. A party of 1500 horse had been detached to Hosur, to watch the movements of the army and to burn forage. It was the policy of General Harris to keep him in the dark, as long as possible, as to the route by which he would advance to Seringapatnam. Three alternative routes were offered. The Anekal Kankanhalli route was determined on by the General Harris after careful deliberation, the idea being taken to deceive Tipu into a belief that Bangalore was his first objective.

Lord Harris moved from Kelamangalam on March 10th. The Sultan's horse harassed the advancing columns at first and succeeded, near the village of Gulisandiram, in cutting up a light company of the rear-guard of the Nizam's congingent. The army camped at Kalugondapalli, on the present Hosur-Tali Road, for the night. The march was resumed on the 12th. On the 27th Tipu was defeated at Malavalli and on May 4th Seringapatnam was stormed and the Sultan slain.

On November 5, 1799, a general redistribution of garrison and detachments throughout the Presidency was effected under the orders of Lord Clive, then Governor.61 "The loss of one-half of his territories had not suffered to humble the pride of Tippu. He still retained ample means for improving his position, and soon brought his army into the highest state

61 Madras District Gazetteers, Salem, By F.J. Richards, 1918, Vol. I, Part-1, p. 87-88.

of efficiency by employing French officers to discipline and command it. His actions left no doubt that he entertained intentions of undertaking a fresh war, with the object of destroying the British power in India.

Lord Wellesley, then Governor-General, resolved to anticipate Tippu's designs, and announced the necessity of still further diminishing his power as " indispensable to the safety of the English Government." By the treaty executed on the division of the Ceded Districts in 1792, the Nizam and the Peshwa had bound themselves to furnish troops should a fresh war be provoked by their common enemy. They were now called upon to fulfil their obligations, but while the Nizam readfly acceded to the demand, the Mahrattas refused to co-operate, and subsequently assumed a threatening attitude. The Madras* army was however directed to take the field, and General Harris was placed in command. Tippu was filled with dismay at the unexpected promptitude evinced by the English. His troops were continuously defeated, and Seringapatam was again invested. On May 3rd, 1798, an assault was made upon its fortifications, which were successfully carried. Tippu's body was discovered among the slain, and the young princes were taken prisoners.

Lord Wellesley's object was not to annihilate the Mysore state, but merely to reduce its power within such limits as should secure the safety of our empire. As the family of Tippu had forfeited all claim to consideration, and were moreover usurpers, it was resolved to restore a portion of the Mysore territory to the ancient line of Rajahs, and a child of five years was drawn from the poverty and obscurity to which his family had been consigned, to occupy the throne." [62]

62 North Arcot Manual, By Archur F Cox, 1881, p. 72-73.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE TOPIC ON MYSORE WARS: RESEARCHER'S ARTICLE

ROLE OF TIPU SULTAN IN THE FOURTH MYSORE WAR *

INTRODUCTION

Tipu sultan was equal to his father Haider Ali in powers of organisation and administrative ability. Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan are two notable figures in the history of Mysore who also came to have global fame as a result of their major role in the history of South India and also by their clash with the British. The career of Tipu Sultan is well worth study for none of the native rulers of India in modern times has had a more ambitious political programme with the exception of Mahadji Sindhia,the great Maratha warrior and statesman of the 18th century. Tipu's neighbours were all his enemies. The three chief enemies were the English,the Marathas and the Nizam.He had a great ambition.The most pathetic and pitiable position of the unfortunate Mughal Emperor did not escape his notice.The sovereignty of Delhi,it appeared would really pass sooner or later to the hands of Marathas or the English. Tipu also wanted to have a chance in the game of political leadership of India,especially against the English whom he cherished an undying hatred. In the present work attempt has been made to give a detailed picture of the role of Tipu Sultan in the Fourth Mysore war. Effort have been made to review the relations which Tipu had with French and British during the fourth Mysore war.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective is to evaluate to what extent Tipu Sultan had worked to liberate the land from foreign yoke. Then to assess the steps taken by Tipu to form a confederacy of Indian rulers to prevent the establishment of British rule,and secret negotiations between Tipu's principal officers and allies with the British which resulted in the fall of Tipu Sultan.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

Narrative and descriptive methods have been used in this study. Primary data like Tipu's military consultations volumes, Lord Wellesley's letters, French and British records, Madras Presidency Manuals, Karnataka Gazetteers and the secondary sources consists of published books and un- published thesis were referred.

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ANGLO-MYSORE RELATIONS

In the 18th century the rulers of Mysore were to face the expansionist threat of the Maratha's on the one hand and that of Haiderabad and Carnatic on the other while the English were to exploit the situation to their advantage Mysore was transformed from a vice royalty of the Vijayanagar empire into an autonomous state by the Wodeyar dynasty. It was left to Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan to establish Mysore as a major military power in the whole of south India. The state of Mysore under two of these mighty rulers,fought with the British as many as four wars. Ultimately both of them were knocked down and thus passed into history,leaving behind a thrilling story in the history of British India.

FIRST THREE MYSORE WARS

The Nizam and Marathas were jealous of Header's rising powers. The English feared his designs on Carnatic. In the first Mysore war (1767-1769) the English did not properly conduct the war and Haider Ali practically dictated terms by threatening Madras in1769. By the terms of the treaty both returned the territories conquered from each other. And the English were to help Haider Ali if he was attacked by any power. In the second Mysore war (1780-1784) the English had not helped Haider Ali and he was attacked by Marathas in 1771. Haider Ali plundered Carnatic. The war came to an end by the Treaty of Manglore by which both the parties returned the territories conquered from each other. Both sides released the prisoners of war [1]. The Third Mysore war (1790-1792) was fought in the time of Lord Cornwallis. Tipu attacked the king of Travangore who was an ally of the British. The British made an alliance with the Nizam and Marathas and declared war on Tipu Sultan[2]. Cornwallis captured Bangalore but retreated for want of provisions in 1791. Cornwallis besieged Tipu Sultan in Seringapatnam in 1792. Then Tipu Sultan made peace. In this Tipu lost half of his territory which was divided between British and Marathas. The war indemnity to three and a half crore of rupees was taken from Tipu and it was divided equally among the allies.

TIPU'S CONTACT WITH FOREIGN POWERS

Tipu tried to raise up allies against his enemies. He had a series of correspondence with many foreign powers ,both Muslim and non-Muslim as suited his purpose. He sent embassies beyond the seas with a view to gain their sympathy and help in the achievement of his own political ambition in India. He opened systematic correspondence with "Grand Sultan" of Constantinople, with Zaman Shah the king of Kabul,Fatteh Ali khan ,the king

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1 Mohibbul Haasan, History of Tipu Sultan, published by Aakar Books, Calcutta,1971,p.12.
2 Karnataka State Gazetteer,Bangalore Rural District,1989, p.86.

of Iran. He seems to have assumed the role of champion of Islam in India and held out before them the plan to start Pan Islamic movement to crush the Non-Muslim powers in India[3].He new very well the anti-English feelings and interests of the French in India. He negotiated with the French,with the object of inducing them to make common cause with him and renew hostilities against the English in India.

He sent letters to Napoleon Bonaparte who in return encouraged their greatest friend 'Tipu Sahib' in his schemes against his enemies and assured the Sultan of his help to deliver him 'From the iron yoke of England'. In his letter dated July, 1798,to the French Directory, he made it a point to mention that he had incurred the enmity of the English because of his 'connection and friendship' with the French. Between 1797 and 1799 he sent envoys to the Governor of Mauritius and obtained French recruits for his army [4].

The sultan planted the Tree of Liberty at Seringapatnam and had been elected as a member of the Jacobin Club of France. The first meeting of the club took place on May 5th, 1797. It was addressed by Ripaud, Tipu assured Ripaud of his friendship for the French Republic. In return the French pledged their support to Tipu whom they called Citizen Prince [5].

FOURTH MYSORE WAR

Tipu wanted to recover his territories which he had lost as a result of third Mysore war. He was carrying on negotiations with the French and Zaman Shah of Kabul. He wanted to expel the English from India. He refused to accept subsidiary system. He was secretly intriguing with the view to win the allies of the English to his side. He even dispatched an embassy to Paris asking for the help of the French. During this time the news of the renewal of hostilities between England and France reached India. Tipu took advantage of those troubled conditions. After the retirement of Sir John Shore, the Governor-General of Bengal (1793-1797), Richard Wellesley was appointed as the Governor-General of Bengal. He changed the policy of neutrality followed by his predecessor and adopted an aggressive policy. He was an anti-Jacobin and imperialist. Lord Wellesley, the Governor General of Bengal (1797-1805) came to India with a policy of aggression and aggrandizement. He was clearly aware that if Tipu was allowed to grow more powerful, he might become an irresistible rival to the English. He wanted to reduce the power of Tipu.

On January 30, 1790, General Malartic, the Governor General of the Isles of France and Bourbon issued a formal proclamation to the citizens of islands about the arrival of

3 Bhatia.H.S,Sultans of South India,Deep&Deep Publications Pvt.Ltd.,NewDelhi,1982,p.192.
4 Ibid,p.193.
5 http..//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/tipusultan

two ambassadors from Mysore to make defensive alliance with the French and to secure military assistance for the purpose of expelling the English from India. That proclamation became an important cause for executing Wellesley's aggressive designs against Tipu. With a view to extend the territory of the British in India Wellessley planned to finish the power of Tipu once for all. He decided to remove the influence of the French from Mysore. Tipu Sultan was charged for making secret plans with the Nizam and the Marathas and sending emissaries to abroad and France. Wellesley made Tipu to know about the documentary evidences about Tipu's intrigues with the French. Tipu explained that only 40 persons of French and Africans came, among them 10 or 12 men were artificers and the rest were the servants of the ships who have come there in search of employment Wellesley was not satisfied with the reply of Tipu. As Tipu felt that the English would invade Mysore, he was waiting for the help from French.[6].

Wellesley issued orders on June 20, 1798, for the assembling of the armies on the coasts of Coramandal and Malabar with out delay, to march to Srirangapatnam. But the forces could not possibly be ready for six months. Thus it made Wellesley to postpone the invasion of Mysore and he started making preparations for the war busily..[7] Thus the main cause of the war was the ambition of Wellesley to reduce Tipu.[8] After winning Nizam to his side, Wellesley convinced the Marathas. The Peshwa promised to help the British if hostilities broke out between the British and Tipu.[9] After making allies in India against Tipu Sultan, Wellesley wrote a letter to Tipu Sultan on 8th November 1798, complaining that Tipu was working against the treaty of Seringapatnam.[10]. Wellesley also proposed to send major Doveton for the establishment of peace and good understanding ,and Wellesley wrote that he also desired to know that when Tipu was willing to receive Devoton and requested for a favorable reply from the Sultan.[11] Tipu wrote to Wellesley that it was difficult for him to accept the proposal of ending all disputes by receiving an ambassador. The motive behind that was to gain enough time till the month of July to receive considerable reinforcement which he expected from France in order to meet his enemies.[12]

Tipu repeated again and again his wish to maintain the articles of the agreement of peace and to continue and strengthen the friendship with the English company, the Peshwa and the Nizam. Tipu knew well that the main aim of sending Doveton was to conclude the same treaty which the company had recently concluded with the Nizam. At the same time

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6 Suryanath.v.Kamnath(ed.), Gazetter of India-Karnataka State,Mysore District,1989,p.94-96.
7 Military Sundry Books 1792-1795,vol.101,p.101-104
8 Manual of Madras Administration,1885,vol.62,p.186.
9 Maclean.C.D.,Manual of the administration of the Madras Presidency in vol.31986,p.87.
10 Military Sundry Books 1792-1795,vol.101,p.101-104
11 Manual of Madras Administration,1885,vol.62,p.186.
12 Maclean.C.D.,Manual of the administration of the Madras Presidency in vol.31986,p.87.

he disliked the idea of becoming a vassal of the English.[13] After a month of silence, Tipu gave a reply to the Governor-General's letter dated 9th January 1799, which was received by Wellesley in Madras on the13th February 1799. In that reply Tipu explained that hence, he was proceeding on a hunting excursion. Major Doverton might not be well received. Therefore the Governor-General's urgent representations had produced no effect on the Sultan, who by his own systematic delay has postponed until the period of season required by him for the advancement of the French army necessary to the common security of the allies. But before the letters of Tipu Sultan reached Wellesley, he had directed General Harris who commanded the English army consisted of 40,000 men from Bengal. The Governor General Wellesley, declared war against Tipu on the 22nd February 1799, on behalf of the East India Company and its allies, then the information was sent to Tipu. The Court of Directors who were opposed to the war earlier had changed their policy from peaceful to aggressive one.[14]

COURSE OF THE FOURTH MYSORE WAR (FEBRUARY-MAY 1799)

The declaration of war by Wellesley on Tipu decided the fate of the Kingdom of Mysore. On February 14, 1799, an army 21,000 men which was gathered at Vellore under General Harris marched towards the Mysore frontier. It was joined with 16,000 men from Haiderabad under Colonel Arther Wellesley, the younger brother of Wellesley. Bombay army of 6,420 men under General Stuart at Cannanore and a large force under Colonels Read and Brown at Trichinopoly were assembled to March on Seringapatnam from South. Though Marathas did not join in the war, Wellesley always refereed to their army as Allied forces.[15]. "All this was directed, against the Chieftain of Mysore, who six years before, was stripped of one half of his Dominions; and left dispossession of a territory yielding a revenue little more than a crore of rupees. Or on million sterling; while the revenue of the Anglo Indian Government alone ,without speaking of that of its ally, exceeded nine millions, what a mass of talent the petty Prince of a petty country must have been supposed to possess!".[16] The Mysore army of Tipu Sultan was divided into three divisions. The main division was under himself, the second division headed by Prince Futtah Haider and Syed Sahib and the third under Mir Qumar-Ud-Din Khan.[17] The Sultan made Nabob Qamar Udin-Khan to command the Mysore army and gave instructions to Mir Sadiq the Divan, to comply with such requisitions as demanded by the Nabob.[18] Major General Floyd was sent in advance with a strong body of Cavalry on the 23rd February 1799, to

13 Sharma.L.P., History of modern India, (ed) 1987, Konark Publications,Chennai, p.73-74.
14 Gazetteer of South India,1885,p.557-64.
15 Military Consultation vol.102A,1798,p.716.
16 Bhatia.H.S.,Sultans of South India, Deep & Deep Publications Pvt.Ltd., New Delhi, 1982, p.186-192.
17 Miltary Consultation book vol.-249, pp. 514-515.
18 Sharma.L., op.cit.,pp.73-74.

cover the passes of the Baramahal. General Harris took command of the leading division at Kariamangalam on 28th February. [19] When Tipu heard of it, he appointed Purnaiya with a large body of troops to oppose the invaders. Tipu also ordered for the assembling of his Amirs and all other men of his army.[20] Meanwhile the British army captured the hill forts of Nildurg, Udayadurg, and Ratnagiri with out much resistence.[21] When Tipu left Srirangapatnam to oppose the Bombay army, his officers like Purnaiya and Syed Saheb had entered in to an understanding with the English. They remained inactive and allowed the enemy to march with out any difficulty.

As a result Harris entered into Mysore easily and occupied number of frontier fortresses with out much resistance. Under these circumstances Tipu's defeat was inevitable.[22] Sayyid Ghaffar the loyal commandant of Tipu was killed by a cannon ball. On the morning of May 4th, Tipu mounted his horse, inspected the breach in the wall and instructed for repairing it. Then he went to palace to have a bath. After performing some religious ceremonies Tipu returned to his post on the ramparts later. [23] The Sultan ordered for the dinner. While he began to eat,he received the news of Sayyed Ghaffer's death. The soldiers of Tipu's army fled due to the fire from the British troops. Tipu rode his horse to the Watergate and ordered the guards to open it but his order was not obeyed. Watergate was closed on the orders of the Diwan Mir Sadiq, the villain who had secret understanding with the British.[24].

When Tipu attempted to pass the gate way, he received wounds. At that time Raja Khan, his personal attendant asked Tipu to make himself known to the enemy. But Tipu ignored it. He preferred death instead of falling as a prisoner in the hands of Britishers. Raja Khan who was along with Tipu was also killed.[25] While Tipu made a stroke at the British soldier, he was shot through the temple and fell dead. The body of Tipu was found out by the Britishers, which was severely wounded and injured.[26] It was removed to the palace in a Palanquin. In the evening of 5th May, the funeral procession of Tipu's body was carried out from the palace. It was buried at Lal Bagh, the garden by the side of his father Haider Ali's Tomb with all military honor.

With the fall of Tipu the only dreadful enemy of the British was removed from the scene forever, and with the fall of Srirangapatnam, the Muslim rule in Mysore ended and the rule of British paramountcy began. After Tipu, there was no one equal to him

19 Miles.W., History of Tipu Sultan, Asian Educational Service. Delhi, 1986, pp.120-121.
20 Manual of the Madras Presidency, p.94.
21 Hayavadana Rao.C.,History of Modern Europe, Eatern Rawat Publication House, Mumbai,1789,pp.92-134.
22 Gazetteer of TamilNadu State,vol.3,1986, p.198.
23 Major Dorom,The Campaign in India ,Tipu Sultan(in 1792) , Published in London Seweel,1793, p.29.
24 Military Consultation ,Tipu to Welleseley on 31st Feb-1799,vol.No.254A,pp.3366-3367.
25 Mohibbul Haasan,op.cit.,p.314.
26 Miltary Consultation Vol-256,23 July,6 August 1799,p.617.

to challenge the British in any state of India. It was regarded as a great victory of Lord Wellesley, who was rewarded with the title of Marquess by the British Government.

The British handed over the rest of the Mysore territory to the successor of the Hindu royal family, Krishnaraj Wodeyar, a child, who was 5 years old at that time on 30th June 1799.

CONCLUSION

Tipu fought bravely and was killed in action. Thus ended the Fourth Mysore War. The settlement was made with Nizam. Nizam was given the territory to the North-east near his dominion. The English took for themselves Kanara on the West, Wynaad in the South-east ,the district of Combatore and Daraporam and the town of Seringapatnam. Some Districts were offered to the Peshwa who had observed neutrality during the war. The remaining part of the Mysore territory was given to a child of the Hindu Royal family namely Krishna Rao to whose Ancestors Mysore Kingdom had belonged before its usurpation by Haider Ali. The new state of Mysore virtually became a dependency of the English.

The fall of Seringapatnam was the beginning of the end of Maratha confederacy. The Marathas failed to realise that the destruction of Mysore will encourage the British to intervene in the internal affairs of the Durbar at Poona. Tipu was a tactful General and a brave Soldier. This has earned him the title “The Tiger Of Mysore”. Tipu was endowed with the clear perception and political foresight. He was very tolerant towards other religion. S.N. Sen, who is commenting on Tipu’s letters to the Swami of Sringeri Mutt (in the Indian Antiquary volume 48 p.102) writes ”Tipu tolerated the practice of Hindu Religion. Tipu was an able ruler. Some English man Stated that Tipu enjoyed sufficient popularity in his kingdom”. Sir John Shore observes that ” The peasantry of his dominions were protected and their laborers encouraged and rewarded.” He was one of the greatest personalities who fought and died for the cause of his own motherland.

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LIST OF SOME DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE IN TAMIL NADU ARCHIVES RELATED TO MYSORE WARS

Sl. No.	Press List Year, Number	Reference	Gist of Document
1	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 3979, 14-Jul-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 169-171.	Copy of letter from the President, to Nizam Ally, advising that he would take prudent and necessary measures to provide for the security of the Carnatic unless convinced that Hyder Ally Cawn had no hostile intentions against the Company.
2	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 3982, 15-Jul-1767	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXVI, pp. 557-571.	Minutes of Consultation relative to : perusal of letters from Colonel Smith, recommending certain officers for their gallant service in the attack upon the rock of Kistuagherry - letter from Colonel Smith advising of the discovery of many passes into the valley, suggesting the entertainment of cavalry, recommending the construction of some works at Vaniembady or Tripatore, intimating the Soubah's approach to the Carnatic, stating that he had asked Colonel Tod to use his discretion in continuing or raising the blockade of Kristnagherry - opinion of the Board regarding keeping up a body of cavalry; consideration of the measures to be taken in consequence of the Soubah's motions; troops to be collected from the Soubah and Worriarpollam; stores to be sent to Vellore and other places; appointment of Mr. Barlow as Paymaster and Storekeeper at those places; despatch of advice as regards these to Colonel Smith; and instructions to him to make a disposition of the army as he thinks necessary; opinion of the Board regarding the conduct of Captain Fitzgerald; appointment of Mr. Monckton as Paymaster of the army - perusal of letter from Captain Brown, desiring directions for his future guidance - despatch of letter to Mr. Browne in reply - consideration of the Board regarding the manner and terms of letting the Chicacole Circar - approval of the proceedings of the Nabob having opened up a new channel on the Island of Syringham - resolution in consequence to write to the Nabob to redress all such grievances.
3	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 3983, 15-Jul-1767	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXVI, pp. 572-582.	Note of : despatch of letters to Colonel Campbell, advising him to settle matters amicably with the Poligars and prepare for defence against Hyder Ally; to Colonel Wood at Trichinopoly, advising of the above; to Captain Mathews giving him directions for his guidance in case of an open rupture with Hyder Ally; to Captain Davis, desiring him to order five companies of his battalions to march to Nellore and wait for further orders; to Colonel Joseph Smith, advising him of the above and desiring him to adopt all precautionary measures for the defence of the Carnatic against Hyder Ally; to the Chief and Council at Masulipatam regarding the letting of the Chicacole Circar to Colonel Campbell, desiring him to adopt the best measures possible for the protection of the country; to Colonel Wood, desiring him to defer sendng the detachment and the guns to Tiagar pending receipt of Colonel Campbell's orders to that effect and to keep in readiness all the troops and ammunition that could be spared for immediate action and to the Chief and Council at Anjengo regarding the complaint against the King of Travancore.

4	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 3984, 16-Jul-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 174-178.	Copy of letter from the President, to the Nabob, regarding the military arrangements to be made for securing the passes leading into the Carnatic against any attempts that might be made by Hyder Ally.
5	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4022, 25-Jul-1767	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXVII, pp. 637-653.	Note of : despatch of letters to Mr. Latham, desiring him to return from the Soubah with Captain Browne, and enclosing two letters, one for the Soubah and one for Ruccum-ud-Dowlah; to Captain Browne, permiting him to detain Ibrahi Beg with him, and desiring him to use his discretion to leave the Soubah, to Colonel Smith, recommending the establishment of an occasional hospital either at Tripatore or Trinomaly; to Colonel Campbell advising of the disposition of the army, desiring him to station a large army at Trichinopoly; to Colonel Wood at Trichinopoly, desiring him to co-operate with Colonel Campbell; Mr. Charles Raitt, appointing him Paymaster of the forces under Colonel Campbell's Command and to the Chief and Council at Cuddalore, desiring them to put the place in a state of defence - receipt of letter from Colonel Wood, advising of the rumour about the march of Hyder Ally from Syringapatam against the Carnatic - despatch and copy of letter to the President and Council at Bombay intimating the situation of affairs - receipt of letters from Colonel Wood, acknowledging receipt of their letter and promising to obey the orders contained therein; from the Chief and Council at Anjengo requesting them (the Board of Fort St. George) to use their influence with the Nabob to pas in their favour a separate instrument for the grant of certain privileges and from Lieutenant Surtees reporting his arrival at Tiagar with three companies of the 8th Battalion of sepoys and three of the 16th - despatch of letters to Colonel Campbell desiring him to settle matters soon with the Poligars and to attend to matters of more importance and to the Select Committee at Fort William, advising of the situation of affairs and requesting their help.
6	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4023, 25-Jul-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 192-194.	Copy of letter from the President, to Nizam Ally Cawn, re his hostile disposition towards the Carnatic and the consequent violation of his solemn engagements with the English.
7	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4025, 26-Jul-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 200, 201.	Copy of letter from the President, to the King of Tanjore, re damages done to the latter's works of irrigation by the Nabob and the hostile disposition of Nizam Ally towards the Carnatic.
8	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4032, 27-Jul-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 202-204.	Copy of letter from the President, to the Nabob, re military arrangements to be made to oppose the attempts that might be made by Nizam Ally and Hyder Ally to invade the Carnatic.
9	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4129, 27-Aug-1767	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXVII, pp. 787-790.	Minutes of Consultation relative to : the necessity of attacking the Nizam and Hyder Ally and bringing the troubles consequent upon the dread of their invasion into the Carnatic to a supply conclusion; resolution thereon directing letters to be written to the Select Committee of Bengal, advising them of the situation of affairs and requesting their help with men and money; to the President and Council at Bombay, advising them of the same and desiring them to lose no time in attacking Hyder Ally's possessions; to the gentlemen at Anjengo and Tellicherry, desiring the former to encourage, the King of Travancore to attack Hyder Ally's possessions contiguous to his territories, and the latter to prevail on the powers in their neighbourhood to repossess themselves of the possessions Hyder Ally had taken from them.

9	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4129, 27-Aug-1767	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXVII, pp. 787-790.	Minutes of Consultation relative to : the necessity of attacking the Nizam and Hyder Ally and bringing the troubles consequent upon the dread of their invasion into the Carnatic to a supply conclusion; resolution thereon directing letters to be written to the Select Committee of Bengal, advising them of the situation of affairs and requesting their help with men and money; to the President and Council at Bombay, advising them of the same and desiring them to lose no time in attacking Hyder Ally's possessions; to the gentlemen at Anjengo and Tellicherry, desiring the former to encourage, the King of Travancore to attack Hyder Ally's possessions contiguous to his territories, and the latter to prevail on the powers in their neighbourhood to repossess themselves of the possessions Hyder Ally had taken from them.
10	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4213, 21-Sep-1767	Mily. Des. to Court, Vol. IV, pp. 159-174.	Copy of a general letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George, to the Court of Directors, relating to : the indifference shown by the Soubah towards the proposals of the Company - negotiations entered into between the Soubah and Hyder Ally - certain promise made by the Soubah to the Company - preparations of the Company to get possession of the barriers between the Mysore and Carnatic countries-fales representations of the Dewan about the Soubah's designs - Nizam's march against the Carnatic, with Hyder Ally - instructions to Messrs. Latham and Brown to leave the Nizam when their stay was unsafe - direction to Colonel Campbell to join Colonel Smith by the way of Tiagar - despatch of a chart of the passes and of the adjacent country - assistance given by the Select Committees at Bengal and Bombay - policy of entering into a treaty with Hyder Ally after his overthrow.
11	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4241, 27-Sep-1767	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XV, pp. 275-281.	Copies of certain correspondence on the subject of the disturbances raised by some of the Poligars in the Carnatic.
12	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4567, 02-Jan-1768	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXIX, pp. 3-14.	Minutes of Consultation relative to : two letters from Colonel Smith, advising of a detachment of a large body of Hyder's troops having left Coverypatam and marching southward, and of Major Fitzgerald's pursuit after the above detachment, proposing a move towards Darampury for want of provisions, and representing that he fears that he might be obliged to retreat towards the Carnatic for want of intelligence from Captain Fitzgerald and others-letter from Major Fitzgerald, advising of his preparations to attack Hyder on the bank of Singarpettah river - letter sent in reply to Colonel Smith embodying the opinion of the Board with regard to the detachment of the enemy from Coverypatam, the Soubah's withdrawal from Nizam Ally, some of the articles to be insisted on, the reason for the necessity of carrying on the operations against Darampury, by a detachment from the army, and the defeat of the troops with Hyder Ally - supplies of provisions to be sent to camp with all expedition-letter from Mr. J. L. Smith at Masulipatam, advising of Colonel Hart's getting possession of Commament - and the appointment of Mr. Fabre as Surgeon's mate to the corps of foreigners.

13	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4642, 25-Jan-1768	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXIX, pp. 139-168.	Minutes of Consultation relative to : letter from Colonel Smith, advising of his sending Major Fitzgerald to Soubah's camp to accompany Ruccum-ud-Dowlah to the Carnatic - letter from the President to Major Fitzgerald, ordering him to insist on Ruccum-ud-Dowlah's coming here direct with not more than 100 horse - letter from Colonel Wood, enclosing a copy of his letter to Colonel Smith representing his situation and the impossibility of moving to Tingracottah for want of provisions - letters from Colonel Wood, advising of Hyder's movements towards the south and of the sickness in the army - letter to Colonel Wood, from the President in reply to the above - orders of the Board in consequence of Hyder's movements - letter from the Chief and Council at Masulipatam, forwarding letters from Colonel Peach regarding the allowances to the Bengal troops and the complaints of the latter on that score - opinion of the Board re the demand made by the Bengal European soldiers - letter from the Chevalier St. Lubin, applying for an allowance to the officers leaving Hyder's service - letter from Mr. Monckton, applying for permission to pay for the horses lost by Major Fitzgerald - and the appointment of Major Bonjour to the command of the corps of foreigners.
14	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4693, 06-Feb-1768	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. IV, pp. 82, 83.	Copy of letter from His Majesty's King George III, to the Nabob of Arcot, congratulating him on his confirmation in the Government of the Carnatic, accepting the whitestone sent to him as a present through Mr. Palk, sending a picture of himself and of the Queen as a memorial of his regard and affection in return, and stating that he had issued orders to send him (Nabob) a Lion from his (King's) own collection, to be kept as a public proof to the powers of Indostan of the regard with which the King of England distinguishes the Nabob.
15	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4694, 06-Feb-1768	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. IV, p. 84.	Copy of letter from the Queen, to the Nabob of Arcot, acknowledging receipt of the present sent to her through Lord Clive and congratulating him on his confirmation in the Government of the Carnatic, &c.
16	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4808, 09-Mar-1768	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XVI, pp. 105-111.	Copy of letter from the Nabob, to the President and Council, Fort St. George, regarding the appointment of his son to manage the affairs of the Carnatic, the submission of a list contraining the several districts, the discharge of his debts due to the Company, the infidelity of the zemindars, the disturbances of Hyder Ally Cawn, the Phirmands of Shah Alum and the saneds from Nizam Ally Cawn, and the despatch of 50,000 pagodas in a week's time.
17	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4809, 09-Mar-1768	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XVI, p. 111.	List of districts belonging to the Carnatic under the Soubahship of Arcot assigned towards the payment of the English Company's debts.
18	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4817, 11-Mar-1768	Pub. Sundries, Vol. XII, pp. 100-102.	Translation of a saned under the seal of the Soubah of the Deccan, conferring by way of Imam Ultumgau upon Omdetul Omrah Meyen Ul Mulck Assedul Dowlah Hussain Ally Cawn Behauder Zoolphcaur Jung, the Carnatic Payen Gaut and Balagaut countries from the banks of the river Kistna towards Pulnaur to the boundaries of Bombay (including the Malavar country) with the whole of the forts, jaghiredars, &c.

19	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4825, 12-Mar-1768	Pub. Sundries, Vol. XII, pp. 98-100.	Translation of a saned under the seal of the Soubah of the Deccan conferring upon the Company in lieu of an annual payment of seven lakhs of rupees the whole of his right and title to the Carnatic Balagaut country belonging to the Soubahship of Daurul Zaphur Viziapoor, before or now possessed by Hyder Naigue.
20			General letter from the Court of Directors, to the President and Council, Fort St. George, relative to : reasons for not sending the 18 and 24 pounder guns of a lighter construction than those hitherto sent, and the information received from the Royal Magazine at Woolwich on the subject - complaints made of great faults in the small arms and the drum-heads sent out last year - rejection of the objections made to the shortness of the musket barrels - the advantages in the locks of the muskets being all made afters one pattern - approbation of the proceedings of the Committee of Stores - endeavours to be made to induce the Nabob to place entire reliance on the Company for the protection of the Carnatic and to discharge most of the sepoys then in his service for the defence of Carnatic; the refusal to sanction more than twenty battalions of sepoys, the prevention of all difference between the officers and the Nabob's Managers and other measures towards the clearance of the Nabob's debts - reduction of the rebellious Poligars to obedience - instructions to the officers commanding in the garrisons to prevent the Poligars from strengthening their Pollams, & c. - impropriety of seizure and confiscation of the warlike stores and the vessels carrying them (supplied to the Country Powers in enmity with the Company's allies) by Europeans and the propriety of the practice of Europeans furnishing the Country Powers with men and warlike stores - establishment of Vizagapatam as a proper repository for the stores to be kept in the Chicacole Circar, the making of the necessary improvements to the place for the purpose - clearance of the Nabob's debt to the Company by the end of the present year agreeably to the expectations given them by the President and Council - disapproval of the negotiations carried on, and the articles of the Treaty concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan in regard to the Northern Circars, the entering into a war with Hyder Ally, the general alliance entered into with the Morattas and the Soubah, and of Lord Clive's ideas of a general alli- ance against the Moratta Powers <-10- marks on the negotiations made with the Soubah re Northern Circars, the devi- ation from the principle "never to grasp at any acquisition that should endanger the Carnatic" - disapproval of the assistance of troops sent to the Soubah -the exclusion of the French from the Circars and the advisability of getting the second article of the Treaty with the Sonbah annulled whereby a body of troops should be kept up ready to settle the affairs of his Government, and of remedying other defects pointed out therein non-interference of Europeans - in the management of the Circars and disapproval of conducting the whole negotiation with the Soubah by a Mili- tary officer unaccompanied by a Civil sorvant in Mr. Pybus' sten/d non- admission of any person into the Company's service in the double capacity of an Engineer and Civil servant, and the consequent rejection of the recommenda- tion made in favour of Mr. Stevens; and orders to Mr. Cotsford appointed Rosi- dent for Ganjam to choose the Engi- neer line or the Civil establishment; confirmation of Mr. Adair in his sp- pointment as Aide-de-Camp to Colonel Smith and non-compliance with his re- quest to be appointed a Captain on the Madras establishment - entertainment of a sufficient supply of cadets for the military service and the rank of those sent out during the present year -

20	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4875, 25-Mar-1768	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. IV, pp. 35-68.	ships of the Company of any of their officers limit to the number of recruits sent out for this year for Fort St. George only appointment of Captains Francis Wheeler and Pryce Donaldson as Majors on the Fort St. George establishment -the formation of the Artillery Corps into a battalion, consisting of five companies and the composition of each Company - retirement of M
21	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 4927, 05-Apr-1768	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. IV, pp. 73, 74.	General letter from the Court of Directors, to the President and Council at Fort St. George, relating to the treacherous conduct of the Soubah and the effects produced by the treaties and negotiations entered into with the several country powers; war with Hyder Ally, and the preservation of the peace and safety of the Carnatic.
22	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 5157, 08-Jun-1768	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXX, pp. 742-769.	Minutes of Consultation re : letter from the Field Deputies, proposing a plan for the operations of the army as the enemy had retired out of Carnatic - letter from Colonel Wood, advising of his arrial at Erode and of the great want of troops to garrison the places taken - letter from the President and Council at Bombay, promising a supply of gunpowder by the Chatham, representing the impracticability of transporting stores from Tellicherry to Bangalore, and advising of Major Gouin's return to Bombay with a part of the troops and of the force left at Mangalore - letter from the Chief and Council at Masulipatam, advising of the proposals made by Jaffer Beg Cawn to rent the Condapilla villages, enclosing an account of the Itchapour province, desiring orders regarding the commencement of the pay of Lieutenant Jones and informing that the sepoy clothing had been issued to the 2nd Battalion commanded by Captain Drinnen - letter from the Chief at Masulipatam, enclosing the proceedings of a General Court-Martial held at Ellour - letter from Colonel Peach regarding the disgraceful defeat of Narraindoo and his intention of attacking the Fort of Jellmore - measures to be taken for resetting the Factory of Ganjam and establishing the Company's authority in the Itchapour districts - report of the Committee of Accounts - and repairs to be made to the Paymaster's quarters at Chingleput.
23	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 5271, 08-Jul-1768	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXX, pp. 917-942.	Minutes of Consultation re : Mr. Drake's taking his seat in the Council-the defeat of a party of Narraindoo's people near Ramanagur by Colonel Peach - imprisonment of the Rajah of Tekaly - appointment of Ram Jogue Pantulu to the management of Narraindoo's possessions-despatch of the Tekaly Rajah to Masulipatam - proposals made by Mr. Carere for furnishing the sick in the hospital at Ellour with medicines - erection of a hospital at the above said place - indent for medicines delivered in by Mr. Lewin Smith - letter from the Field Deputies, advising of their intention to order Colonel Campbell to march immediately against Oussoor, and of an attempt made by Captain Cosby to surprize the horse under Mucktom Sahib and desiring of the Carnatic might join their army-Colonel Wood's successes against Coimbatore, &c. - troops to be sent from Vellour to Trichinopoly - and orders to the Commandants of Trichinopoly, Madura and Palamcotah to send to Colonel Wood such fieldpieces as would answer his purpose.

24	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 5484, 25-Aug-1768	Mily. Country Correspondence, Vol. XVI, pp. 207-209.	Copy of leter to the Nabob, advising of the orders to Colonel Wood to join the army with his corps, and of the reason for the detention of Major Fitzgerald's army in the Carnatic, desiring him to make the strictest enquiry in regard to the collection of revenues from the lands assigned to the Company, and enclosing a reply for Rajah Ramchunder.
26	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6440, 11-Feb-1769	Tellicherry Factory, Vol. XXII, pp. 56-63.	Note of : receipt of letter from the Captain of the snow Luconia, requesting directions for his sailing - receipt of a letter from the Supracargoes at Canton, regretting the non-supply of sandalwood and hoping to receive a supply of sandalwood and pepper soon - receipt of letter from Mr. John Call, urging the commencement of war against Hyder soon - receipt of information regarding the position of our army in Carnatic; the victory of army at Trichinopoly over Hyder; the despatch of letters to Mr. Day at Calicut, remitting Rs. 2,000 - despatch of letters to the President and Council, Bombay, requesting permission to trade with Mangalore to secure supply of rice, the supply of fire-engines and an increase of pay to topasses; and intimating the proposed meeting of the Chief with the Prince of Colide and the further supplies of pepper promised, the losses sustained by the Prince of Cherrika and advice given to the Commander of snow Luconia - death of Cherriandy Cunhamod.
27	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6441, 11-Feb-1769	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXXIII, pp. 80-89.	Minutes of Consultation re : Hyder's cowle for entering into a treaty of peace with the English - instructions to Mr. Andrews at Cuddalore to proceed to Hyder's Camp to treat with him - measures to be concerted for dislodging Hyder from the Carnatic in the meantime - applications to be made to Mahadeva Row, Morari Row, the King of Tanjore, &c., for procuring a body of horse for the abovementioned purpose - Captain Fletcher's successes over the brother of the late Rajah of Ongole - orders to Colonel Lang to proceed to Colar for another trip of stores - the detachment engaged in the recovery of the Kimmedy districts - the tottering state of the Soubah's Governments on account of the Soubah's Court being entirely controlled by the Mahratta Power - Narraindoo's overtures for peace - and the settlement with the Rajahs of Goomsur, &c.
28	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6460, 13-Feb-1769	Mily. Cons., Vol. XXXIII, pp. 90-103.	Minutes of Consultation re : the Nabob's approval of the measures proposed for procuring a body of horse to dislodge Hyder out of the Carnatic - garrisons to be kept in Vencatagherry, Peddanaiguedurgam and Sautgur - orders solicited regarding the allowances of Captain-Lieutenant Mackay and Lieutenant Geils - allowances to Major John Elly - works to be executed at Masulipatam and Vellore for the defence of those places - account of the terms of the contract for victualling the troops and supplying them with bullocks - adjustment of the expenses of the expedition to the Deccan and the war with Hyder Ally - orders to Mr. Pringle to repair to Madras - and the dismissal of Cornet Duniard from the service.
29	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6582, 06-Mar-1769	Mily. Sundries, Vol. XL, pp. 244-247.	Copy of letter from the President and Council at Bombay, to the President and Council at Fort St. George, re : peace to be concluded with Hyder - unsuccessful application made to the Captain-General at Goa for a body of Europeans to set in the Mysore country - the remote probability of Mahadrow's invading Carnatic-and allowances made to such of the officers at Madras as were not furnished with barracks.

30	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6598, 08-Mar-1769	Mily. Des. to England, Vol. V, pp. 78-113.	tempt upon Colar, and the courageous conduct of Captain-Lieutenant Johnson who hade made good his retreat from Daraporum to Trichinopoly - further movements of Hyder towards Turaiyur and Arrialore and the pursuit after him by Major Fitzgerald who fell in with a body of the enemy on his march to Gingee, killed about 300 of them and took several horses - overtures - to conclude a peace, and the unreasonable articles proposed by Hyder - measures adopted for the prevention of any designs by the enemy - the necessity for procuring a body of horse, the improbability of realizing the same by the method proposed, the want of resources for carrying on the war, and the inability of the King of Tanjore to render any help - the assurance given by the Nabob of his ability to collect a respectable body of horse - the proposals recommended to be made to Mahadarow to prevent his taking part with Hyder, and the motives for adopting that measure; the alliance entered into between the Soubah, Mahadarow and Hyder, and the immediate steps taken for the security of the forts in the Carnatic, the Circars and the Company's settlements - Mahadarow's advance towards those parts, and his sudden return to the Berar Country to oppose Jannojee – the necessity for the combination of the Soubah with Mahadarow – the measures resolved upon by the Gentlemen at Bengal to force Mahadarow to give up his intentions of assisting Hyder, and the sentiments of the Board of their resolution – the request to Colonel Smith to go to Madras for a personal conference on the future measures for bringing Hyder to a decisive action— the complaint made by Colonel Smith and the reports against Mr. Call, the contractor, for supplying the army with provisions ; the enquiry into the matter; and the resolution for the future victuailling of the army — the complaints against Messrs. Call and Mackay for having acquired advantages by the bazaar in Camp — the. resolution arrived at in Council with the assistance of Colonel Smith regarding the distribution of the army, which seemed most likely to promise success in the present situation ; and the relinquishment of the plan proposed owing to advices received of the alliance entered into between the Soubah, Mahadarow and Hyder — Colonel Wood's recall to Madras, and his letter in vindication of his conduct — enquiry regarding the quantity of provi- sions found in the Mysore Country, and the disposal of the same — acoounts currént with the several Zemindars and Renters in the Circars — the disturbances committed by Volle Row at Masulipatam ;- and his flight; the order to demolish the forts he possessed himself of, and the resolution to lessen the n
31	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6696, 17-Mar-1769	Mily. Des from England, Vol. IV, pp. 1-7.	Letter from the Court of Directors, to the Honourable Charles Bourchier, Esq., Josias Du-Pre, Esq., Warren Hastings, Esq., Brigadier General Joseph Smith and Alexander Wynch, Esq., relating to : their appointment as a Select Committee and the necessity for such a body - orders to exert themselves in the suppression of the French power in the Carnatic - their views of the Mysore Country - the probable difficulties with the Country Powers, and the necessity for attending to the defence of the Carnatic and to the reduction of the forces kept up by the Company and the Nabob - the support to be given to the Nabob in his demands on the Rajah of Tanjore - the report of the amount of the Nabob's debt to certain individuals; the impropriety of the members of the Board being trustees; and the statement to be transmitted to the Court, with full particulars of the Nabob's debts, and the measures to be taken by the Board towards the liquidation of the same - the necessity for reducing the number of the force kept by the nabob - their disapproval of the mode adopted for supply of provisions to the army - the necessity for the revision of the enquiry into the charges against Messrs. Dowsett and Cuming.

32	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6808, 01-Apr-1769	Mily. Sundries, Vol. XL, pp. 371-373.	Copy of letter from Captain Kelly, to the President, Fort St. George, representing his distress for provisions and suggesting a certain plan which would not only supply Colar with all manner of provisions, but would also create such a diversion about Bangalore as might oblige Hyder to quit his hold of the Carnatic.
33	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6826, 03-Apr-1769	Pub. Sundries, Vol. XII, pp. 110-117.	Treaty of perpetual friendship and peace made and concluded between the Governor and Council of Fort St. George on behalf of the Company for all their possessions and for the Carnatic Payengaut on the one part and the Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn Behauder for the country of Mysore Hyder Nagur, and his other possessions on the other part on the conditions stated therein.
34	PRESS LIST 1765-1769, 6851, 05-Apr-1769	Letters from Fort St. George, Vol. XLIII-A, pp. 22, 23.	Copy of letter from the Governor and Council, to Lieutenant-Colonel DeBeck, re : the conclusion of a treaty with Hyder Ally - and the restoration of Shevellepettur, Sundrabandy and other places in the Carnatic by Hyder Ally Cawn.
35	PRESS LIST 1780, 1780, 14-Nov-1780	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXII, p. 1919.	Note of despatch of letter to the Governor-General and Council of Bengal thanking them for sending Sir Eyre Coote with reinforcements for the service of this Presidency.
36	PRESS LIST 1780, 1780, 14-Nov-1780	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXII, pp. 1919, 1920.	Note of despatch of letter to the Governor and Select Committee at Bombay acquainting them of the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote with a detachment of Europeans ; forwarding for transmission a letter to the Court of Directors ; and enclosing copy of letter from the Resident at Ganjam respecting French cruizers.
37	PRESS LIST 1780, 1780, 14-Nov-1780	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXII, pp. 1920, 1921.	Note of despatch of letter to Sir Edward Hughes informing him of the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote with a reinforcement ; of the appearance of French cruizers in the Straits ; of teh suspension of Mr. Whitehill from his officer as Governor and President, Select Committee ; and of the succession of Mr. Smith thereto.
38	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 06-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 69, 70.	Note of the despatch and copy of a letter to Sir Eyre Coote requesting him to return to the Presidency for the recovery of his health, stating that Colonel Lang had proceeded to camp and desiring him that he would give necessary instructions to Colonel Lang.
39	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 07-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 79-101.	Proceedings of the Select Committee relative to : the perusal of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote intimating his distressed situation, pointing out the necessity of laying up a stock of provisions in Madras D. Mackay to the Adjutant-General on the subject of his rank together with the copy of the answer thereto - resolution that Captain Mackay's rank as Major be according to the Commission granted to him, to be in force only during his service on the Malabar Coast - the Perusal of a letter from Mr. Graham advising of General Coote's dangerous illness - resolution to send copy of the letter referred to above to Sir Eyre Coote - the perusal of a letter from the Committee of Works relative to Mrs. Casamajor's claim for the sale of a certain ground to them on account of the demolition and removal of the buildings and houses on Hog Hill and enclosing a letter from Mr. Maxwell regarding the same ; resolution that Mrs. Casamajor's claim be allowed and discharged by bills on Bengal - the perusal of a letter from Ensign Fairfield enclosing a certificate for ill-health from the Surgeon-General the perusal of a letter from Major Maule stating that in his opinion Hog Hill was so far reduced and levelled as to give no advantage to an enemy - resolution to desire Major Maule to send in the plans and sections by which Mr. Plumer engaged

39			to remove Hog Hill - the perusal of a letter from Mr. Benfield relative to his proposal for providing a large number of bullocks for the army, his objections to the agreement proposed to him by the Committee and the circumstances that led to his accepting the appointment of Agent, and his inability to provide money ; of Agent - minute on the abovementioned letters from Mr. Benfield - resolution to appoint Captain Bedford to act as Commissary of Stores and Mr. Hammock as Conductor of Stores at Vizagapatam - the consideration of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote relative to a letter received by him from Colonel pearse stating that one of the battalions of one of the Bengal regiments had been disorderly on account of their pay - the President's having sent for the Civil Secretary in consequence of the abovementioned letter to know if the sum of 70,000 pagodas ordered to be issued for the army had been sent to camp, and the despatch and copy of a letter to SirVellore, that coolies were ready to set out and Chingleput had arrived - the consideration of papers communicated by the Secretary and Town Major - copy of a letter from Mr. Freeman to Mr. Hamilton concerning the money to be sent to camp - copy of Mr. Hamilton's reply to the same - copy of letter from Captain Mackay to Captain Sydenham regarding bullocks - copy of letters from Captain Smith to Captain Sydenham regarding the same.
40	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 13-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 143, 144.	Note of despatch and copy of a letter to Bengal expressing their obligation of the proof afforded by them for the support of the Company's interest, stating thaty they would take into consideration the measures recommended by them, and intimating that Vellore was being relieved by Sir Eyre Coote.
41	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 17-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 189-193.	Note of the receipt and copy of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote advising of his having been attacked by the enemy on his return from Vellore, and of his having repulsed them, requesting that the Supreme Council might be informed of the relief of Vellore and that Mr. Holland might be instructed to inform the Nizam about it and to try to obtain his assistance, stating that a large body of French and Dutch troops were expected on the coast, and enclosing return of casualties.
42	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 19-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 195-197.	Note of the receipt and copy of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote intimating that the army had returned to Tripassore, and complaining that a sufficient stock of grain had not been laid up there.
43	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 20-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 199.	Note of the despatch and copy of a letter to Bengal informing them of the return of the army to Tripassore and enclosing copies of two letters from Sir Eyre Coote.
44	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 21-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 201-206.	Note of the receipt and copy of letters : from Sir Eyre Coote enclosing copy of a letter from Colonel Nixon relative to his having been divested of all responsibility for affairs to the southward ; advising of the clamerous state of the troops on account of their pay being in arrears, stating that the fortifications which he was very anxious to carry on were put a stop to and requesting that the general return of troops transmitted by him to Governor-General might be examined ; enclosing copy of a letter from Colonel Nixon concerning the Reddy of Terriore.

44	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 21-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 201-206.	Note of the receipt and copy of letters : from Sir Eyre Coote enclosing copy of a letter from Colonel Nixon relative to his having been divested of all responsibility for affairs to the southward ; advising of the clamerous state of the troops on account of their pay being in arrears, stating that the fortifications which he was very anxious to carry on were put a stop to and requesting that the general return of troops transmitted by him to Governor-General might be examined ; enclosing copy of a letter from Colonel Nixon concerning the Reddy of Terriore.
45	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 21-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 206-207.	Note of the consideration of the above-mentioned letters from Sir Eyre Coote and resolution to issue a sum of money to the garrison of Trichinopoly and to order the Paymaster at that place to enquire how it can be remitted.
46	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 21-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 207-209.	Note of the despatch and copy of letter to Sir Eyre Coote complying with his request for permission to resign the command.
47	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 24-Jan-1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 222-223.	Note of the receipt and copy of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote enclosing copy of a letter from General Stuart relative to his being able to take the field.
48	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 31/Jan/1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 269-278.	Note of : the receipt and copy of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote on the subject of the general letter to England and enclosing letters from Major Mackay and Captain Burrowes - copy of a letter from Major Mackay, to Sir Eyre Coote, enclosing a letter to the Select Committee requesting permission to resign the service and preoceed to Europe - copy of letter from Captain Burrowes requesting permission to return to Europe.
49	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 31/Jan/1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 279.	Note of resolution to inform Sir Eyre Coote that the application of Captain Burrowes to him for permission to proceed to Europe was irregular.
50	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782,	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. XIV, p. 103.	Copy of letter from the Secretary-at-War, to the Paymaster-General, directing payment of £400 to Mr. Anderson, borrowed by Lieutenant-Golonel McLeod for the subsistence of his battalion and requesting communication of the same to Sir Eyre Coote for making necessary adjustments.
51	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782,	Mily. Des. from Court, Vol. XIV, pp. 121-127.	Copy of letter from the secretary-at-War, to the Paymaster-General, transmitting a letter received from Mr. Robinson with copy of a letter and account from Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod of the 2nd battalion of the 42nd Regiment, advising of the intention of the Lords Commissioners of the treasury to pay off the said account, and requesting that the necessary deductions be made out of the remittances from India and the same communicated to Sir Eyre Coote.
52	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 02/Feb/1782	Mily. Cons., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 291-295.	Note of the despatch and copy of a letter to Sir Eyre Coote respecting the affairs of the army.

53			Note of the receipt and copy of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote on the subject of granting leave to officers.
54			Note of the receipt and copy of letter from Sir Eyre Coote advising of his desire to postpone Captain Edington's Court-martial till his arrival at the Presidency and of the despatch of a detachment to Chingleput with rice, &c.
55			Copy of a letter to Bengal enclosing copy of a letter from Cuddalore respecting certain French ships, the encampment of Sir Eyre Coote near the Mount waiting for intelligence from the Admiral and the future operations of the army.
56			Note of receipt of addresses from the Rajah of Travancore for Lord Macartney and Sir Eyre Coote and copy of letter to the Resident at Tanjore forwarding the same.
58	PRESS LIST 1782, 1782, 26/ Mar/1782	Mily. Des. to Court, Vol. XVI, pp. 175-186.	Copy of general letter to England regarding : the receipt of advices from Tellicherry of the arrival of a large reinforcement to the assistance of Major Abington and of the defeat of Hyder Ally, from fort Marlborough of the Capture of the Dutch Fort on that Coast, and from Bombay of the arrival of General Meadows with 400 troops - the capture of the fort and harbour of Trincomalee and Fort Ostnburg - the receipt of letter from Pulicat advising of the arrival of a fleet on the coast and of their having taken and burnt a nuber of small vessels laden with grain for Madras and of the capture of His Majesty's frigate the Chaser - an engagement of the enemy with Sir Edward Hughes - procedure of the French fleet with transports to Porto Novo ; the total defeat of Colonel Brathwaite by Tippu situation of the Tanjore country - the situation of the British army at Tanjore - the arrival at Anjengo of Colonel Humberston and Captain Smith from Bombay ; their sailing to Ceylon to join Major Abington against the French - the necessity of attacking Hyder in the Bidinour country - the movements of Hyder Ally and the measures taken to root out his power in the Carnatic - the appointment of Mr. David Anderson to negotiate with the Mahrattas - the state of Mr. Holland's negotiation with the Subadar and the tone and demands of that Prince at that time - the desaptch of a letter from Mr. Wetherston who was deputed to the Mahrattas by General Gordon relative to the peace with the Mahrattas - teh violation of the agreement made by the Nabob the appointment of Mr. Davidson as member of the Select Committee - General Meadows' declinging to join the army and his intention to return to England - embarkation of Colonel Edward James for England agreeably to the permission granted to him - the request of Sir Eyre Coote for the specification in the despatches from England of cadets sent to India to whom a preference might be given - the grant of Permission to Captain Waller Adair and Lieutenant Henry Rice to proceed to England.